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In 2014, DoD created a new policy to give “liberal
consideration” to veterans seeking to upgrade their other-thanhonorable discharges due to mental health conditions. The policy,
known as the Hagel Memo, was later clarified and supplemented in
August 2017 by the Kurta Memo. This Article analyzes how the Naval
Discharge Review Board as a representative of the discharge review
boards has implemented the guidance based on decisions released
after the August 2017 Kurta Memo’s clarifying guidance.
This Article contributes to the discussion on military and
veterans’ mental health issues through the lens of how the discharge
upgrade process fails to respond to the growing understanding and
awareness of PTSD and other mental health conditions. This Article
explains how the discharge review boards have failed to implement the
liberal consideration policy guidance and offers a path forward, from
a big picture redefinition of “Honorable” to specific revisions to Navy
procedures that serve as examples for all the services to consider. The
discharge review boards have the opportunity to acknowledge that the
military abandoned these veterans at the discharge stage when they
received an other-than-honorable discharge and—more importantly—
to provide relief by giving them a hand up rather than kicking them
again.
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INTRODUCTION
Michelle Essex served in the U.S. Navy Reserve for fifteen years.1 She had
an exemplary record of service as a Navy Reservist including multiple awards in
recognition of that service.2 She was never disciplined for any misconduct.3 She
deployed to Afghanistan from May 2011 to February 2012 in support of
Operation Enduring Freedom.4 Her performance record from November 2012 to
November 2013 could not have been more positive: “[Petty Officer Essex] is on
fire and is the workhorse of this Det[achment]. She is the right person at the right
time to further elevate the unit’s success. Her LEADERSHIP and determination
to drive others to perfection is unmatched and is a major asset to the entire
command.”5
After completing her reserve duty, Petty Officer Essex received an
honorable discharge and then enlisted for active duty for six years.6 She served
only four months and five days before the Navy discharged her on October 13,
1. Michelle Essex is a fictitious name for the veteran in Naval Discharge Review Board (NDRB)
decision ND17-01559. The decision is on file with the author.
2. NDRB No. ND17-01559.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. (emphasis in original).
6. Id.

1360

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 108:1357

2014, for using drugs.7 Given the Navy’s zero-tolerance policy for drug abuse,
she underwent mandatory processing for administrative separation.8 Despite her
strong record but for this one incident, her command discharged her—kicked her
out—with an “Under Other Than Honorable Conditions” characterization and
“Misconduct (Drug Abuse)” as the narrative reason.9 This discharge
characterization tainted her previous years of exemplary service.
Less than two years later, Michelle sought treatment for mental health
concerns related to military sexual trauma (MST) she experienced while serving
in the Navy.10 In February 2016, a civilian psychiatrist diagnosed Michelle with
post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) due to the MST.11
In September 2017, Michelle sought to upgrade her discharge to
“Honorable” by filing the appropriate documents with the Naval Discharge
Review Board (NDRB or “the Board”).12 Michelle explained in the application
that the MST and PTSD she experienced led her to use drugs to cope with how
she was feeling.13 She explained that she had an impeccable record of service but
for this one incident, and that her mental health condition, rather than intentional
misconduct, had caused the incident.14 She provided medical and service records
as well as her own statement to support her upgrade request.15
The Board recognized Michelle’s MST and PTSD diagnosis.16 It
recognized her fifteen years of service with no other adverse action and
determined that Michelle’s “diagnosed PTSD and MST was a mitigating factor
associated with her in-service misconduct.”17 The Board described Michelle’s
service as “honest and faithful” and considered her combat tour and her
exemplary performance record.18
The Board voted unanimously to change Michelle’s discharge status, but
granted her only a partial upgrade.19 The Board explained that it “does not
consider PTSD as a reason to completely absolve the Applicant of her
misconduct” and that “significant negative aspects of the Applicant’s conduct
outweighed the positive aspects of [her] service.”20 Therefore, the Board
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. Throughout this Article, I refer to former servicemembers seeking discharge upgrades as
“veterans” unless directly quoting from a decision with the term “Applicant” because the word “veteran”
is more respectful of the servicemembers’ service than the generic term “Applicant.” The term “veteran”
is defined by statute as “a person who served in the active military, naval, or air service, and who was
discharged or released therefrom under conditions other than dishonorable.” 38 U.S.C. § 101(2) (2018).
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changed Michelle’s discharge from “Under Other Than Honorable Conditions”
to “General (Under Honorable Conditions).”21 The Board did not change the
narrative reason, however, and Michelle’s discharge paperwork continues to
refer to her misconduct and undermine her record of exemplary service by
referring to her reason for discharge as “Misconduct (Drug Abuse).”22
Like Michelle, thousands of servicemembers have been discharged with
other-than-honorable discharges due to misconduct that can be traced to a mental
health condition. According to a 2015 report, more than 600,000 servicemembers
received a less-than-fully-honorable discharge between 2000 and 2013.23 In May
2017, the Government Accountability Office reported that 62 percent of the
91,764 servicemembers discharged “for misconduct from fiscal years 2011
through 2015 had been diagnosed within the 2 years prior to separation with
post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), traumatic brain injury (TBI), or certain
other conditions that could be associated with misconduct.”24 In that five-year
period, 57,141 servicemembers were kicked out of the military for what may
have been behavior that resulted from a mental health condition.25
After leaving the military with an other-than-honorable discharge, veterans
are “generally ineligible to receive VA benefits, including education, housing,
employment, disability compensation, burial benefits, and, in many cases, even
healthcare.”26 They may also be banned from joining veterans’ service

I use the term “veteran” more broadly than the statutory definition to refer to any person who served in
the armed forces. See Bradford Adams & Dana Montalto, With Malice Toward None: Revisiting the
Historical and Legal Basis for Excluding Veterans from “Veteran” Services, 122 PENN. ST. L. REV. 69,
94 (2017) (explaining how statutory reorganization of veterans benefits law “has come to mean that a
former servicemember deemed ineligible by the VA is essentially told that he or she is not a ‘veteran’
in the eyes of the federal government—despite the fact of his or her service in the armed forces”).
21. NDRB No. ND17-01559.
22. Id.
23. INST. FOR VETERAN POLICY, SWORDS TO PLOWSHARES, VETERANS AND BAD PAPER
(2015),
https://www.swords-to-plowshares.org/wp-content/uploads/Bad-Paper-Fact-Sheet-June2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y2CT-4KE5]. “Bad paper” means “other-than-honorable, bad conduct, or
dishonorable discharge, and may include a general discharge as well.” Michael J. Wishnie, “A Boy Gets
Into Trouble”: Service Members, Civil Rights, and Veterans’ Law Exceptionalism, 97 B.U. L. REV.
1709, 1724 (2017).
24. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-17-260, DOD HEALTH: ACTIONS NEEDED TO
ENSURE POST-TRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER AND TRAUMATIC BRAIN INJURY ARE CONSIDERED IN
MISCONDUCT SEPARATIONS, highlights (2017).
25. Id.
26. SUNDIATA SIDIBE & FRANCISCO UNGER, VIETNAM VETERANS OF AM. & NAT’L
VETERANS COUNCIL FOR LEGAL REDRESS, UNFINISHED BUSINESS: CORRECTING “BAD PAPER” FOR
VETERANS WITH PTSD 3 (2016), https://www.vetsprobono.org/library/attachment.312768
[https://perma.cc/KF3R-7PHG]; see also Marcy L. Karin, “Other Than Honorable” Discrimination, 67
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 135, 137–39 (2016) (discussing how the Uniformed Services Employment and
Reemployment Act (USERRA) has not protected veterans with other-than-honorable discharge and
explaining that these discharges “have disproportionately impacted people with service-connected
injuries like post-traumatic stress disorder and traumatic brain injury, servicemembers who have
experienced military sexual trauma, and people with caregiving responsibilities”); Stacey-Rae Simcox,
Thirty Years of Veterans Law: Welcome to the Wild West, 67 KAN. L. REV. 513, 564 (2019) (discussing
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organizations, face challenges in employment, and experience homelessness.27
These veterans are also “more likely to suffer mental health conditions . . . and
to be involved with the criminal justice system, and they take their own lives
twice as often as other veterans.”28 Veterans with other-than-honorable
discharges are typically outside the care of the Department of Veterans Affairs
(VA), and “[the] rate of death by suicide among Veterans who do not use VA
care is increasing at a greater rate than Veterans who use VA care.”29 Beyond
health care and economic resources, veterans with other-than-honorable
discharges suffer a diminished status. They are “not permitted to wear their
uniforms or receive a military burial.”30 In sum, their service is not honored, and
an other-than-honorable discharge “impos[es] a lifetime stigma that marks the
former service member as having failed family, friends, and country.”31 In the
truest sense of the words, these servicemembers are kicked out and left behind.
Once the military labels veterans with an other-than-honorable discharge,
they have little recourse.32 Even though there are administrative remedies
the potentially “severe” consequences of other-than-honorable discharges, including loss of rights to
“educational grants, home loans, healthcare, and disability benefits”).
27. SIDIBE & UNGER, supra note 26, at 3.
28. Wishnie, supra note 23, at 1724; see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, BOOTED: LACK OF
RECOURSE FOR WRONGFULLY DISCHARGED US MILITARY RAPE SURVIVORS 4–5 (2016),
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/us0516_militaryweb_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/5QJPV255] (discussing the correlation of “bad paper” with “high suicide rates, homelessness, and
imprisonment”). I’m not arguing that discharge status caused these effects, but that there is a correlation
between discharge characterization and access to benefits, and the lack of benefits such as health care
may lead to untreated mental health symptoms. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra, at 77; Tiffany
M. Chapman, Leave No Soldier Behind: Ensuring Access to Health Care for PTSD-Afflicted Veterans,
204 MIL. L. REV. 1, 16 (2010) (noting “the strong correlation between PTSD and substance abuse,
mental health problems, and persistent misconduct”).
29. See Hans Petersen, Other-than-Honorable Discharge? You’re Still Eligible for VA Mental
Health Care, U.S. DEP’T VETERANS AFF.: VANTAGE POINT (May 15, 2019),
https://www.blogs.va.gov/VAntage/60349/other-than-honorable-discharge/ [perma.cc/M3HV-QGQP];
see also John W. Brooker et al., Beyond “T.B.D.”: Understanding VA’s Evaluation of a Former
Servicemember’s Benefit Eligibility Following Involuntary or Punitive Discharge from the Armed
Forces, 214 MIL. L. REV. 1, 11 (2012) (“The military, through its discharge process, is creating huge
handicaps to readjustment and reintegration into society by limiting the possibility of care and failing to
at the least stabilize these warriors before their rough ejection.”); Rebecca A. Clay, Access to Care for
All Veterans, MONITOR ON PSYCHOL., June 2017, at 20 (describing 2017 suicide-prevention initiatives).
30. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 28, at 5; see also 38 U.S.C. § 2302 (2018) (limiting
benefits to “veteran,” as defined in § 101(2) as a “person who served in the active military, naval, or air
service, and who was discharged or released therefrom under conditions other than dishonorable”); U.S.
DEP’T OF DEF., DOD INSTRUCTION 1300.15, MILITARY FUNERAL SUPPORT 3–4 (2017),
https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodi/130015p.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Y7HW-2L37] (stating that recipients of other-than-honorable discharges are ineligible
for military funeral honors); Eligibility for Burial in a VA National Cemetery, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS
AFFAIRS, https://www.va.gov/burials-memorials/eligibility/ [https://perma.cc/6K9Z-WTTT] (stating
that recipients of other-than-honorable discharges are ineligible for burial in a VA national cemetery).
31. Wishnie, supra note 23, at 1724.
32. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 28, at 5 (“Despite the high stakes for veterans, there is
little meaningful opportunity to appeal a bad discharge (also called applying for an ‘upgrade’).”).
The lack of “meaningful opportunity” to get the government to right a wrong is consistent with the ban
on suits against the military for service-related injuries or harm. Id. (“[S]ervice members are prohibited
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available for veterans to request a change to their discharge—called a “discharge
upgrade”—very few discharge upgrade requests are granted.33 “[T]he vast
majority of applicants seeking to alter their discharge status (well over 90 percent
and in some years as high as 99 percent) are rejected.”34 The low grant rate
reflects the “‘historic hostility’ in the military toward veterans with other-thanhonorable discharges.”35 These rejections are often based on the written
application alone without the benefit of a hearing.36 Furthermore, the application
form itself is inherently limited by its two-page list of questions with checkboxes and small-text boxes, which do not lend themselves to conveying

by longstanding Supreme Court precedent from suing the military for injuries or harm that ‘arise out of
or are in the course of activity incident to service.’” (quoting Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135
(1950)). The U.S. Supreme Court reinforced Feres in 2019 when it denied certiorari in a case asking the
Court to reconsider Feres in a medical malpractice suit where petitioner’s wife, “Navy Lieutenant
Rebekah Daniel, died at a naval hospital due to a complication following childbirth.” Daniel v. United
States, 587 U.S. ___, 139 S. Ct. 1713 (2019) (mem.) (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas dissented
from the denial and warned that “[s]uch unfortunate repercussions—denial of relief to military personnel
and distortions of other areas of law to compensate—will continue to ripple through our jurisprudence
as long as the Court refuses to reconsider Feres.” Id. at 1714.
Though Feres still prohibits judicial claims, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2020 included a provision to allow administrative claims “against the United States for personal injury
or death incident to the service of a member of the uniformed services that was caused by the medical
malpractice of a Department of Defense health care provider.” 10 U.S.C. § 2733a(a) (2020). This
administrative remedy falls short of calls to allow servicemembers to sue the Department of Defense.
See Rose Carmen Goldberg, Commentary, Let’s Make 2020 the Year Injured Service Members Finally
Get
the
Right
to
Sue
DoD,
MIL.
TIMES
(Dec.
30,
2019),
https://www.militarytimes.com/opinion/commentary/2019/12/30/lets-make-2020-the-year-injuredservice-members-finally-get-the-right-to-sue-dod/ [https://perma.cc/53VX-259A]; David P. Sheldon &
Corey D. Bean, Explainer, Can You Now Sue the Military for Medical Malpractice?, NAVY TIMES (Dec.
26, 2019), https://www.navytimes.com/news/your-navy/2019/12/26/explainer-can-you-now-sue-themilitary-for-medicalmalpractice/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Navy%20122619&utm_ter
m=Editorial%20-%20Navy%20-%20Daily%20News%20Roundup [https://perma.cc/8E78-V4H6].
33. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 28, at 5. It is also the case that very few veterans apply
for an upgrade. Id. at 94 (“Though thousands of service members may have been wrongfully discharged,
very few apply for a discharge upgrade or a change in narrative reason for separation.”); SIDIBE &
UNGER, supra note 26, at 2 (“Tens of thousands of eligible veterans appear not to have submitted
applications.”).
34. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 28, at 5.
35. Nikki Wentling, Pentagon Expands Policy to Upgrade Vets’ Bad Paper Discharges, STARS
& STRIPES (Aug. 29, 2017), https://www.stripes.com/news/pentagon-expands-policy-to-upgrade-vetsbad-paper-discharges-1.485038 [https://perma.cc/TX6P-CXZ2] (quoting Professor Michael Wishnie).
36. See, e.g., Robert Powers, President, NDRB, Sec’y of the Navy, Council of Review Boards,
NDRB Presentation to Veterans Legal Assistance Conference of 2019, at 2–3 (June 7, 2019) (on file
with author) (reporting 771 document review cases and 130 hearing cases in the first two quarters of
FY19).
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complicated information.37 Very few veterans have legal counsel or
representation.38
To some extent, then, Michelle’s story is a victory because any relief from
the Board is relatively unusual. But Michelle received only partial relief. In
giving her only partial relief, the Board ignored Michelle’s exemplary service
and focused exclusively on the one flaw in her record. For thousands of veterans
discharged with other-than-honorable characterizations due to behavior
connected to a mental health condition, the odds of even partial relief are slim to
none. Thus, they live in a world where the military kicked them out rather than
cared for them, and when they later sought relief, the Board kicked them again.
Rather than continue this pattern of punishing veterans for having mental
health conditions—commander kicks them out and the discharge review board
kicks them again—veterans deserve the opportunity for true relief in recognition
of their service and the mental health condition they developed due to that
service. Recent Department of Defense (DoD) policy guidance reflects this need
for change. DoD requires discharge review boards to give “liberal consideration”
to “veterans petitioning for discharge relief when the application for relief is
based in whole or in part on matters relating to mental health conditions,
including PTSD; TBI; sexual assault; or sexual harassment.”39 Liberal
consideration recognizes the relationship between mental health conditions and
behavior that looks like misconduct. The policy is aimed at correcting past
injustices that resulted from commanders regularly discharging servicemembers
under other-than-honorable conditions when their misconduct was related to a
mental health condition.40 This Article contributes to the discussion on military
and veterans’ mental health issues by assessing liberal consideration and its
implementation.
Part I begins with a brief background on discharge characterizations and a
description of the discharge upgrade process. Part II briefly discusses PTSD and
two military-unique stressors: combat and military sexual trauma. This Part also
37. U.S. Dep’t of Def., DD Form 293, Application for the Review of Discharge from the Armed
Forces
of
the
United
States
(Dec.
2019),
https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/forms/dd/dd0293.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2C89H2E7].
38. See, e.g., NDRB No. ND17-00909 (on file with author) (“Representation: NONE”). Of the
477 NDRB decisions I reviewed for this project, three had a private representative, and eleven had
civilian counsel. The rest had no counsel. See NDRB Decisions (Shared), GOOGLE SHEETS
https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/19NYWu2HZkYvnmCw2h0zum8E_KBiciGrBlWYCLc_cl0/ [https://perma.cc/LZ9T-MJE7]. See infra notes 41, 200 and accompanying text.
39. See Memorandum from Chuck Hagel, Sec’y of Def., to Secretaries of the Military Dep’ts 1
(Sept.
3,
2014),
https://www.secnav.navy.mil/mra/bcnr/Documents/HagelMemo.pdf
[https://perma.cc/P9A2-JXUZ] [hereinafter Hagel Memo]; A.M. Kurta, Acting Under Sec’y of Def. for
Personnel and Readiness, to Secretaries of the Military Dep’ts, at Attach. ¶ 3 (Aug. 25, 2017),
https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/Clarifying-Guidance-to-Military-DischargeReview-Boards.pdf [https://perma.cc/75X9-SFVF] [hereinafter Kurta Memo] (supplementing the
Hagel Memo).
40. See Kurta Memo, supra note 39. For an in-depth discussion of liberal consideration, see infra
Part III.B.
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describes the relationship between PTSD and misconduct. Part III takes a
broader-scope look at mental health care in the military and then narrows to
articulate recent policy guidance to liberally consider the relationship between
mental health conditions and misconduct in the context of discharge upgrades.
By using the Naval Discharge Review Board as a representative of all the
discharge review boards, Part IV identifies four themes based on Board decisions
to explain how the boards have failed to implement the liberal consideration
policy guidance.41 Part V offers a path forward, from a big-picture redefinition
of “Honorable” to specific revisions to Navy procedures that serve as examples
for all the armed services to consider. These changes can provide hope to
veterans who were kicked out of the military for mental health conditions they
experienced due to their military service. The boards have the opportunity to
acknowledge that the military abandoned these veterans at the discharge stage
when they received an other-than-honorable discharge and, more importantly, to
provide relief by giving them a hand up rather than kicking them again.
I.
DISCHARGE CHARACTERIZATIONS AND UPGRADES
When a servicemember is discharged from military service, the quality of
their service is memorialized on Department of Defense Form 214, Certificate

41. This Article identifies problems that are not unique to the NDRB but are shared by the other
services’ boards. This Article uses the NDRB decisions to generalize about all the boards’ decisions
even though the NDRB’s rates of relief have been lower than those of the other services’ boards (though
all boards’ rates of relief have been relatively low given the initial optimism of liberal consideration)
and because the Navy and Marine Corps have high rates of other-than-honorable discharges. See, e.g.,
DoD Review Boards Select Claims Data Q3 2017, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF.,
https://boards.law.af.mil/stats_CY2017_Quarter%204%20%28Oct-Dec%202017%29.htm
[https://perma.cc/C9MG-NL5X] (Quarter 3 for mental health claims adjudicated, Air Force Discharge
Review Board (AFDRB): 27.7 percent; Army Discharge Review Board (ADRB): 40.9 percent; NDRB:
25 percent); U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DoD Review Boards Select Claims Data Q4 2017,
https://boards.law.af.mil/stats_CY2017_Quarter%204%20%28Oct-Dec%202017%29.htm
[https://perma.cc/C9MG-NL5X] (Quarter 4 for mental health claims adjudicated, AFDRB: 47 percent;
ADRB: 63.6 percent; NDRB: 24 percent). Another reason this Article considers the NDRB decisions is
that the “Navy’s screening policies [were] not consistent with DoD policy,” and the Navy’s training on
TBI was also not compliant with DoD guidance, thus increasing the likelihood that discharge decisions
were improper or inequitable. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 24, at 16. The Marine
Corps apparently had compliant screening and training policies, but GAO found that implementation of
these policies was possibly incomplete. Id. at 24–25. As a practical matter, the Article uses NDRB
decisions because they are the decisions I had access to after the online reading room that provided
access to all the boards’ decisions was shut down for an indeterminable amount of time in 2019. I started
my research in January 2019 with the NDRB decisions and fortunately downloaded about 500 decisions
before the reading room disappeared in April 2019. My research assistant, Heidi Weimer, created a
database of the 477 decisions I had downloaded, and I used that set of decisions for my work on this
article. NDRB Decisions (Shared), supra note 38. The Department of Defense has agreed to make these
decisions available again. See Patricia Kime, Pentagon Agrees to Republish Discharge and Records
Correction Decisions, MIL. TIMES (Jan. 22, 2020), https://www.militarytimes.com/news/yourmilitary/2020/01/22/pentagon-agrees-to-republish-discharge-and-records-corrections-decisions/
[https://perma.cc/XM5E-LSKM].
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of Release or Discharge from Active Duty, known as a DD-214.42 The discharge
characterization is a decision that a commanding officer typically makes as part
of the process of separation from service, and an upgrade is something veterans
can seek after they have left military service. This Section briefly summarizes
the various discharge characterizations and the process for requesting a discharge
upgrade to lay the foundation for the later discussion about the Board’s failure
to implement policy guidance in reviewing discharge upgrade requests.
A. Discharge Characterizations
Discharges are categorized as either administrative or punitive.
Administrative separations include Honorable, General (Under Honorable
Conditions (UHC)), Under Other Than Honorable Conditions (UOTHC), and
Uncharacterized.43 The ideal discharge is Honorable, and the majority of
servicemembers are honorably discharged. For example, in Fiscal Year 2015,
149,952 of the 189,411 discharges were Honorable.44 Punitive discharges
include Bad Conduct and Dishonorable. In Fiscal Year 2015, there were 809
punitive separations.45 This Article focuses on administrative discharges because
the overwhelming majority of discharges are administrative and most discharge
upgrade requests are from veterans with an administrative separation.46
1. Honorable Discharge
DoD loosely defines Honorable as “service [that] generally has met the
standards of acceptable conduct and performance of duty for military personnel,
or is otherwise so meritorious that any other characterization would be clearly
inappropriate.”47 The Navy’s definition of Honorable is basically the same, but
42. See DD Form 214, Discharge Papers and Separation Documents, NAT’L ARCHIVES,
https://www.archives.gov/personnel-records-center/dd-214 [https://perma.cc/BVV4-CK79].
43. DEF. MANPOWER DATA CTR., ACTIVE DUTY SEPARATIONS BY CHARACTER OF
DISCHARGE
(2016),
https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/FOID/Reading%20Room/Personnel_Related/16_F_0
516_Number_Service_Members_Discharged_By_Characterization_And_Branch_Of_Service.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UWK4-TAHK]. Uncharacterized discharge includes situations when the service was
too short to be otherwise qualified, such as entry-level separation, or for void enlistment. See DEP’T OF
DEF., INSTR. 1332.14, ENLISTED ADMINISTRATIVE SEPARATIONS (Jan. 27, 2014) (C4, Apr. 12, 2019),
https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodi/133214p.pdf?ver=2019-03-14132901-200 [https://perma.cc/HQT6-QWGE] [hereinafter DoDI 1332.14]. For a history of discharge
characterizations, see Adams & Montalto, supra note 20, at 74–80. For a history of administrative
discharge, see Bradley K. Jones, The Gravity of Administrative Discharges: A Legal and Empirical
Evaluation, 59 MIL. L. REV. 1, 2–10 (1973).
44. DEF. MANPOWER DATA CTR., supra note 43.
45. See id.
46. Id. Of the 477 decisions in my decisions database, 453 involved veterans with administrative
discharges and twenty-four involved veterans with punitive discharges. See NDRB Decisions (Shared),
supra note 38.
47. DoDI 1332.14, supra note 43, enclosure 4, para. 3(b)(2)(a); see also U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY,
REG. 135-178, ENLISTED ADMINISTRATIVE SEPARATIONS para. 2-9(a) (Nov. 7, 2017),
https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/ARN3941_AR135-178_WEB_Final.pdf
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with specific reference to the Navy: Honorable should be assigned when “the
quality of the member’s service generally met the standard of acceptable conduct
and performance for naval personnel, or is otherwise so meritorious that any
other characterization of service would be clearly inappropriate.”48 Beyond this
general definition, whether a servicemember receives an Honorable discharge is
at the discretion of the Separation Authority, consistent with secretarial
characterization.49 The Separation Authority is typically the commander or
commanding officer (the leader of a particular command), but may be a higherlevel official.50
The Honorable characterization is deeply rooted in the military culture of
maintaining good order and discipline. As the DoD instruction explains, “[t]he
quality of service of an enlisted Service member on active duty or active duty for
training is adversely affected by conduct that is of a nature to bring discredit on
the Military Services or is prejudicial to good order and discipline.”51 Military
leaders consistently rely on the need for “good order and discipline” to oppose
changes in military justice reform.52 The concept of “good order and discipline”
is not clearly defined, however, and is mostly a matter of a commander’s broad
discretion within the overall idea “that discipline is a fundamental basis for
military effectiveness.”53
Typically, the military determines Honorable service by considering the
complete record of service, and only a pattern of misconduct can justify an other-

[https://perma.cc/XC5J-4D5E] [hereinafter AR 135-178] (same definition, replacing “military” with
“Army”).
48. U.S. DEP’T OF NAVY, MILITARY PERSONNEL MANUAL (MILPERSMAN) 1910-304,
DESCRIPTION OF CHARACTERIZATION OF SERVICE para. 1, at 1 (June 30, 2008),
https://www.public.navy.mil/bupersnpc/reference/milpersman/1000/1900Separation/Documents/1910-304.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Z8H7GJV2] [hereinafter MILPERSMAN 1910-304].
49. 10 U.S.C. § 1141 (2018); U.S. DEP’T OF NAVY, MILPERSMAN 1900-010, LIST OF
DEFINITIONS
para
1(y)
(Sept.
20,
2011),
https://www.public.navy.mil/bupersnpc/reference/milpersman/1000/1900Separation/Documents/1900-010.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8R7PP3CN].
50. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF NAVY, MILPERSMAN 1910-702, GENERAL GUIDANCE FOR
SEPARATION AUTHORITIES (SA) para. 1 (Jan. 3, 2018), https://www.public.navy.mil/bupersnpc/reference/milpersman/1000/1900Separation/Documents/1910-702.pdf [https://perma.cc/4M5H9UM9] [hereinafter MILPERSMAN 1910-702]; U.S. DEP’T OF NAVY, MILPERSMAN 1900-120,
SEPARATION BY REASON OF CONVENIENCE OF THE GOVERNMENT – MEDICAL CONDITIONS NOT
AMOUNTING TO A DISABILITY para. 2 (Nov. 9, 2018), https://www.public.navy.mil/bupersnpc/reference/milpersman/1000/1900Separation/Documents/1900-120.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2ZPX4EVL].
51. DoDI 1332.14, supra note 43, enclosure 4, para. 3(b)(1)(b).
52. Jeremy S. Weber, Whatever Happened to Military Good Order and Discipline?, 66 CLEV.
ST. L. REV. 123, 125 (2017) (“Despite agreeing to some modifications, military leaders have opposed
proposals to remove certain prosecution decisions from the commanders of the accused
servicemembers.”).
53. Id. at 127. Also, in reviewing commanders’ decisions, “individual judges or court members
must decide for themselves whether specific acts prejudiced good order and discipline based on their
individual, unstated, fact-specific criteria.” Id. at 145.
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than-honorable discharge.54 But even this general requirement for a pattern of
misconduct can be ignored if the commander determines that “a single incident
provides the basis for [an other-than-honorable] characterization.”55 The Navy’s
guidance for types of discharge characterizations even more explicitly allows for
one instance to justify an other-than-honorable discharge.56
2. Other-than-Honorable Discharge
DoD generally defines the various other-than-honorable administrative
discharge characterizations, but the specific parameters vary by service.57 These
characterizations are mostly based on a commander’s discretionary
determination that a servicemember failed to maintain good order and discipline.
This is demonstrated by a particular incident or pattern of incidents that
“constitutes a significant departure from the conduct expected of enlisted Service
members of the Military Services.”58 Even though DoD characterizes these
other-than-honorable discharges as administrative and not punitive, they are
often punitive in nature. An other-than-honorable discharge carries a stigma and
bars access to many veterans’ benefits.59 The military specifically gives an otherthan-honorable discharge to recognize and announce to the world that the
servicemember did not fulfil their service commitment because they failed to
meet “required standards of performance or discipline.”60 Consistent with that
failure, veterans with an other-than-honorable discharge are typically ineligible
54. Though “pattern” is mentioned several times in DoD’s instructions for separation decisions,
that term is not defined, leaving it to the commander’s discretion on a case-by-case basis. See DoDI
1332.14, supra note 43, enclosure 3, para. 10(a)(2); id. enclosure 2, para. 2(a) (“administrative process
based on command discretion”).
55. Id. enclosure 4, para. 3(b)(1)(c).
56. MILPERSMAN 1910-304, supra note 48, para. 1, at 2 (“one or more acts [or] omissions”).
57. Karin, supra note 26, at 159–60.
58. DoDI 1332.14, supra note 43, enclosure 4, para. 3(b)(2)(c)(1)(a).
59. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 28, at 6. An other-than-honorable discharge does not
absolutely bar a veteran from all VA benefits, but it does create a presumptive ineligibility. See
VETERANS BENEFITS ADMINISTRATION, Applying for Benefits and Your Character of Discharge, U.S.
DEP’T
VETERANS
AFF.,
https://www.benefits.va.gov/benefits/character_of_discharge.asp
[https://perma.cc/P2E5-87ZD] (“Generally, in order to receive VA benefits and services, the Veteran’s
character of discharge or service must be under other than dishonorable conditions (e.g., honorable,
under honorable conditions, general). However, individuals receiving undesirable, bad conduct, and
other types of dishonorable discharges may qualify for VA benefits depending on a determination made
by VA.”); U.S. DEP’T VETERANS AFF., CLAIMS FOR VA BENEFITS AND CHARACTER OF DISCHARGE:
GENERAL INFORMATION (2014), https://www.benefits.va.gov/BENEFITS/docs/COD_Factsheet.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZJC8-4569] (describing the relationship between VA benefits eligibility and character
of discharge); see also ALI R. TAYYEB & JENNIFER GREENBURG, WATSON INST., “BAD PAPERS”: THE
INVISIBLE AND INCREASING COSTS OF WAR FOR EXCLUDED VETERANS 4 (2017),
https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/papers/2017/Tayyeb%20Greenburg_Bad%20Pap
ers%20.pdf [https://perma.cc/JAK8-AVQ3] (showing same).
60. U.S. DEP’T OF NAVY, MILPERSMAN 1910-010, ENLISTED ADMINISTRATIVE
SEPARATION (ADSEP) POLICY AND GENERAL INFORMATION para. 2(a) (Oct. 18, 2019),
https://www.public.navy.mil/bupersnpc/reference/milpersman/1000/1900Separation/Documents/1910-010.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6PDZK5PM].
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for benefits and may face significant challenges in civilian life as mentioned in
the Introduction. Even the General (UHC) discharge carries some stigma because
it is by definition less than Honorable, though it does permit eligibility for some
VA benefits.61
B. Discharge Upgrade
Veterans with other-than-honorable discharges can request a discharge
upgrade through a military records correction board or discharge review board.62
Each service has its own administrative boards as established by statute and
regulation,63 and this Article focuses on the Naval Discharge Review Board,
which reviews discharges for Sailors and Marines, as a representative example
of all the boards. This Article focuses on the discharge review boards rather than
the records correction boards because the discharge review boards are the firststage boards for those seeking relief within fifteen years of their discharge.
Improving the quality of the decision-making at the discharge review boards
could reduce the number of appeals to the correction boards.
The process for requesting a discharge upgrade is standardized across the
services. There are two forms: DD-293 and DD-149. The DD-293 is used for a
request submitted to a discharge review board (DRB)64 and the DD-149 goes to
a records correction board.65 Veterans may request a discharge upgrade through
a DRB up to fifteen years after discharge,66 and they can appeal a denial to a
records correction board.67 The records correction board is the only avenue
available for veterans seeking an upgrade to a discharge of more than fifteen
years old. The boards are expected to provide “uniformity among the Military
Departments in the rights afforded applicants in discharge reviews,”68 though
each branch has its own policies and procedures. A discharge review board may
grant relief for impropriety or inequity. Regulations governing DRB standards
identify the objective of discharge review as “to examine the propriety and equity
61. DoDI 1332.14, supra note 43, enclosure 4, para. 3(b)(2)(b); Applying for Benefits and Your
Character of Discharge, supra note 59 (listing the discharge requirements for various VA benefits).
62. 10 U.S.C. § 1553 (2018).
63. Id.
64. Supra note 37.
65. U.S. Dep’t of Def., DD Form 149, Application for Correction of Military Record Under the
Provisions
of
Title
10,
U.S.
Code,
Section
1552
(Dec.
2014),
https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/forms/dd/dd0149.pdf
[https://web.archive.org/web/20191129022452/https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/fo
rms/dd/dd0149.pdf].
66. 10 U.S.C. § 1553(a) (2018).
67. 10 U.S.C. § 1552(a)(1) (2018); see also Army Discharge Review Board, ARMY REVIEW
BOARDS AGENCY, https://arba.army.pentagon.mil/adrb-faq.html [https://perma.cc/LV48-BZCA]
(“[Y]ou may appeal the written discharge review decision by applying to the Army Board for Correction
of Military Records (ABCMR).”).
68. 32 C.F.R. § 70.4(b)(2) (2018); U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., INSTR. 1332.28 para 4.1.2 (Apr. 4, 2004),
https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodi/133228p.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X8HD-NN46].
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of the applicant’s discharge.”69 Impropriety is generally defined as “an error of
fact, law, procedure, or discretion associated with the discharge at the time of
issuance.”70 Equity is generally understood as a question of fairness on the facts,
despite a proper procedure.71 Equity relies on changes in policies and procedures
that enhance rights or create “[a] substantial doubt that the applicant would have
received the same discharge if relevant current policies and procedures had been
available” at the time of discharge.72 A discharge may be inequitable if a
“discharge was inconsistent with the standards of discipline”73 at the time of
discharge or if on the whole “it is determined that relief is warranted” based on
quality of service and capability to serve “even though the discharge was
determined . . . otherwise equitable and proper at the time of issuance.”74
The discharge review process is “slow, complicated, and opaque.”75 There
is little information available to help guide pro se applicants about what it takes
to be successful, and decision times range from ten months to almost two years.76
In 2018, an article in the Military Times reported that “the three service review
boards have nearly 26,000 cases that have been pending for more than 10
months, the department’s standard for a backlogged request. More than half of
those are before the Army, whose backlog is just under 14,000 cases.”77
The discharge review boards and corrections boards have been under closer
scrutiny in the past few years as they increased their backlogs and lengthened
their decision times. Additionally, the boards inconsistently implemented (if at
all) the liberal consideration policy guidance intended to account for the
69. 32 C.F.R. § 70.9(a) (2018). The records correction boards review for error, injustice, or
clemency. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 1552(a)(1), (f)(2); 32 C.F.R § 581.3(e)(3)(iii) (2018); see also
Memorandum from Robert L. Wilkie, Under Sec’y of Def., to Secretaries of the Military Dept’s (July
25, 2018) (on file with author) (directing boards to use clemency “to ensure fundamental fairness” for
“applications based on pardons for criminal convictions”).
70. 32 C.F.R. § 70.9(b) (2018); DEP’T OF THE NAVY, SEC’Y OF NAVY INSTR. (SECNAVINST)
5420.174D, NAVAL DISCHARGE REVIEW BOARD (NDRB) PROCEDURES AND STANDARDS para. 502
(Dec.
22,
2004),
https://www.secnav.navy.mil/doni/Directives/05000%20General%20Management%20Security%20an
d%20Safety%20Services/05400%20Organization%20and%20Functional%20Support%20Services/5420.174D.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8L5Q-49B7] [hereinafter SECNAVINST 5420.174D].
71. 32 C.F.R. § 70.9(c) (2018).
72. Id. § 70.9(c)(1)(ii).
73. Id. § 70.9(c)(2).
74. Id. § 70.9(c)(3); SECNAVINST 5420.174D, supra note 70, at 503.
75. VETERANS LEGAL CLINIC, LEGAL SERVS. CTR. OF HARV. LAW SCH., UNDERSERVED: HOW
THE VA WRONGFULLY EXCLUDES VETERANS WITH BAD PAPER 19 (2016), https://www.swords-toplowshares.org/wp-content/uploads/Underserved.pdf [https://perma.cc/MEC4-7L7L].
76. See id.; Robert Powers, supra note 36, at 4 (showing an average length of ten months to
decision for documentary review and twenty-two months to decision for personal appearance hearing);
see also SIDIBE & UNGER, supra note 26, at 1, 11; Alissa Figueroa, A Losing Battle, FUSION (2014),
http://interactive.fusion.net/a-losing-battle/ [https://perma.cc/Q93T-J7DX].
77. Leo Shane III, Can DoD Fix the Painfully Long Wait for Reviews of Bad-Paper Discharges?,
MIL.
TIMES
(Sept.
28,
2018),
https://www.militarytimes.com/news/pentagoncongress/2018/09/28/lawmakers-eye-an-overhaul-of-military-review-boards-system/
[https://perma.cc/R4Y4-967P].

2020]

KICKED OUT, KICKED AGAIN

1371

relationship between mental health conditions and behavior defined as
misconduct under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). The liberal
consideration policy guidance reflects a better understanding of the relationship
between mental health and behavior, and at least questions—if not fully rejects—
the traditional response to kick out servicemembers for misconduct that is related
to PTSD or other mental health conditions. The next Section explains the
relationship between mental health and behavior in the military as well as
identifies military-unique stressors.
II.
HOW TO GET KICKED OUT: POST-TRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER AND
MILITARY SERVICE
Many servicemembers were (and continue to be) kicked out of the military
with an other-than-honorable discharge characterization for misconduct when
that misconduct is actually a result of PTSD, traumatic brain injury (TBI),
military sexual assault, or other mental health conditions. PTSD “is a psychiatric
disorder that can occur in people who have experienced or witnessed a traumatic
event such as a natural disaster, a serious accident, a terrorist act, war/combat,
rape or other violent personal assault.”78 Servicemember PTSD has historically
been referred to as “shell shock” and “combat fatigue,” and although this mental
health condition is not limited to military servicemembers, the particular nature
of military service may increase the chances a person experiences a traumatic
event, or stressor, that causes PTSD.79 In this Section, I briefly explain two
uniquely military stressors for PTSD, combat and military sexual trauma, and
then discuss how PTSD affects behavior.
A. PTSD: Traditional Combat-Related and Military Sexual Trauma
The modern understanding of PTSD grew from the experiences of those
who served in the Vietnam War and the mental health struggles returning
veterans experienced and continue to experience.80 In 1980, five years after the
Vietnam War ended, the American Psychiatric Association recognized PTSD as
78. What
is
Posttraumatic
Stress
Disorder?,
AM.
PSYCHIATRIC
ASS’N,
https://www.psychiatry.org/patients-families/ptsd/what-is-ptsd [https://perma.cc/TJ3M-JTAP]; see also
NAT’L
CTR.
FOR
PTSD,
PTSD
Basics,
U.S.
DEP’T
VETERANS
AFF.,
https://www.ptsd.va.gov/understand/what/ptsd_basics.asp [https://perma.cc/4B36-XYXD] (“PTSD . . .
is a mental health problem that some people develop after experiencing or witnessing a life-threatening
event, like combat, a natural disaster, a car accident, or sexual assault.”).
79. See What is Posttraumatic Stress Disorder?, supra note 78.
80. PUBLIC HEALTH, PTSD and Vietnam Veterans: A Lasting Issue 40 Years Later, U.S. DEP’T
VETERANS AFF., https://www.publichealth.va.gov/exposures/publications/agent-orange/agent-orangesummer-2015/nvvls.asp [https://perma.cc/7RXC-77EE] (“It was first officially recognized as a mental
health condition in 1980, only five years after the end of the Vietnam War. For hundreds of years, these
symptoms have been described under different names in soldiers from many wars. However, Vietnam
Veterans with these symptoms were the first to have the term ‘PTSD’ applied to them. Despite the
passage of 50 years since the war, for some Vietnam Veterans, PTSD remains a chronic reality of
everyday life.”). For a brief history of PTSD, see Chapman, supra note 28, at 6–23.
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a “disorder” by adding it to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders, thus finally legitimizing the various combat and combat-related
mental health experiences of many Vietnam veterans.81 A VA study in 1983
concluded that “as many as 15 percent of Veterans had PTSD.”82 Estimates
suggest that “[30 percent] of Vietnam Veterans have had PTSD in their
lifetime.”83 Even though experts later validated PTSD as a legitimate mental
health diagnosis, that recognition did not help the many veterans the military
already discharged for misconduct symptomatic of PTSD. In 2014, a class action
lawsuit brought attention to Vietnam veterans in this situation.84 The case was
settled to achieve reforms, shining a light on the injustices that veterans with
PTSD faced seeking a discharge upgrade, and directly led to new policy
guidance, as discussed in Part III.B.85
The military’s inadequate care for Vietnam veterans with PTSD is well
documented,86 and the inadequacy continues with current-conflict veterans.87 As
Professor Stacey-Rae Simcox explained, Vietnam veterans are affected by PTSD
more than by other conditions, and “Iraq and Afghanistan veterans find
themselves suffering from higher numbers of brain injury in addition to PTSD,
a result of the life-saving technologies and body armor, which help to limit the
impact of explosions that in previous conflicts would have caused death.”88 The
poor treatment of Vietnam veterans is certainly not excusable, but there was a
real lack of understanding and awareness of PTSD at that time.89
81. NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, POST-TRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER (PTSD) (2010),
https://archives.nih.gov/asites/report/09-092019/report.nih.gov/nihfactsheets/Pdfs/PostTraumaticStressDisorder(NIMH).pdf
[https://perma.cc/JT3Z-SFCL].
82. PUBLIC HEALTH, supra note 80.
83. NATIONAL CENTER FOR PTSD, How Common is PTSD in Veterans?, U.S. DEP’T VETERANS
AFF., https://www.ptsd.va.gov/understand/common/common_veterans.asp [https://perma.cc/HZ5VY7YN].
84. Complaint, Monk v. Mabus, No. 3:14-cv-00260 (WWE) (D. Conn. 2014).
85. Monk, 2014 WL 7794807 (Nov. 18, 2014); see also VETERANS LEGAL SERVS. CLINIC,
Monk v. Mabus, YALE LAW SCH., https://law.yale.edu/studying-law-yale/clinical-and-experientiallearning/our-clinics/veterans-legal-services-clinic/monk-v-mabus
[https://perma.cc/9GFH-N97A]
(providing overview of case).
86. See, e.g., Evan R. Seamone, Dismantling America’s Largest Sleeper Cell: The Imperative to
Treat, Rather than Merely Punish, Active Duty Offenders with PTSD Prior to Discharge from the Armed
Forces, 37 NOVA L. REV. 479, 518 (2013).
87. Karin, supra note 26, at 162–69; Seamone, supra note 86, at 510 (“Although, for more than
a generation, military lawyers, veterans’ advocates, legislators, VA psychiatry experts in PTSD, and
senior mental health professionals within the military have consistently raised concerns over the Military
Misconduct Catch-22, there has been no successful corrective action. In fact, the Marine Corps recently
learned that 326 of the 1,019 Marines it had dismissed with less-than-honorable characterizations (in the
first four years following the war in Iraq) had legitimate mental health care needs. Despite this
knowledge, the Marine Corps made no effort to determine whether that population eventually obtained
benefits.” (footnotes omitted)).
88. Simcox, supra note 26, at 564.
89. See Daniel Burgess et al., Reviving the “Vietnam Defense”: Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder
and Criminal Responsibility in a Post-Iraq/Afghanistan World, DEV. MENTAL HEALTH L., Jan. 2010,
at 59, 59 (“[I]t was not until 1980 that the American Psychiatric Association officially recognized
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Today, however, there is no such lack of awareness, and there is a
significantly improved if incomplete understanding of PTSD and how it affects
servicemembers during and after service. Thus, “the failure of the military to
recognize and treat servicemembers from our current conflicts is inexcusable.”90
The National Center for PTSD noted that for veterans of current conflicts
(Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)),
“between 11-20% . . . who served in OIF or OEF have PTSD in a given year.”91
12 percent of Gulf War (Desert Storm) veterans experience PTSD, and 15
percent of Vietnam veterans have PTSD with a current diagnosis “at the time of
the most recent study in the late 1980s,” and about 30 percent “of Vietnam
Veterans have had PTSD in their lifetime.”92 Combat is the most commonly
known stressor for PTSD, and it may be “the most notoriously treatmentresistant.”93
But combat is not the only military stressor for PTSD. MST is another
major stressor, and sexual assault is a growing problem in the military (or a
problem with growing recognition). In a recent report, DoD reported a 13 percent
increase in sexual assault reports in the military from FY 2017 to FY 2018.94
This most recent increase follows a 9 percent increase in sexual assault reports
in the FY 2017 report, indicating an upward trend in reporting.95 DoD defines
sexual assault as:
Intentional sexual contact characterized by the use of force, threats,
intimidation, or abuse of authority or when the victim does not or cannot
consent . . . . [T]he term includes a broad category of sexual offenses
consisting of the following specific UCMJ offenses: rape, sexual
assault, aggravated sexual contact, abusive sexual contact, forcible
sodomy (forced oral or anal sex), or attempts to commit these offenses.96
Vietnam Syndrome—or as it came to be known, post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”)—as a
psychological illness.”).
90. Simcox, supra note 26, at 565.
91. How Common is PTSD in Veterans?, supra note 83.
92. Id.
93. Deborah C. Beidel et al., Trauma Management Therapy with Virtual-Reality Augmented
Exposure Therapy for Combat-Related PTSD: A Randomized Controlled Trial, 61 J. ANXIETY
DISORDERS 64, 64 (2019) (citing Bradley V. Watts et al., Meta-Analysis of the Efficacy of Treatments
for Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, 74 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 541 (2013)).
94. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., APP. B: STATISTICAL DATA ON SEXUAL ASSAULT (2019),
https://www.sapr.mil/sites/default/files/Appendix_B_Statistical_Data_on_Sexual_Assault.pdf
[https://perma.cc/XRL2-NMAZ].
95. DoD treats the increase in reporting as a positive: “With sexual assault being a significantly
underreported crime, a higher proportion of reporting is an indicator that victims continue to gain
confidence in the sexual assault prevention and response and military justice systems, especially when
increased reporting is paired with decreased sexual assault prevalence (occurrence).” SEXUAL ASSAULT
PREVENTION & RESPONSE OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., FISCAL YEAR 2017 ANNUAL REPORT ON
SEXUAL
ASSAULT
IN
THE
MILITARY
1
(2018)
https://www.sapr.mil/public/docs/reports/FY17_Annual/FY17_Annual_Report_Fact_Sheet.pdf
[https://perma.cc/N7PD-9LRQ].
96. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., INSTR. 6495.02, SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION AND RESPONSE
(SAPR) PROGRAM PROCEDURES, glossary at 122 (Mar. 28, 2013) (C3, May 24, 2017),
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Trauma from sexual assault and sexual harassment that a servicemember
experienced is called military sexual trauma, as defined by the VA. This term is
broader than DoD’s definition of sexual assault, and it recognizes the
“psychological trauma” caused by “a physical assault of a sexual nature, battery
of a sexual nature, or sexual harassment which occurred while the veteran was
serving on active duty, active duty for training, or inactive duty training.”97
Just as with combat or combat-related stressors that lead to PTSD, MST is
also a recognized stressor for PTSD.98 In fact, “sexual assault has a larger impact
on PTSD symptomatology than any other trauma, including combat exposure.”99
And MST “may be more strongly associated with PTSD and other health
consequences than is civilian sexual trauma.”100 Some studies support “an
estimated one in three sexual assault survivors experience[s] PTSD, as opposed
to a 10 to 18 percent prevalence rate of PTSD for combat veterans.”101 The
particular nature of the military and its culture of discipline and obedience “may
make survivors feel undutiful or disloyal when reporting [an] assault.”102
Survivors often experience “intense shame, guilt, and disbelief” as they struggle
to reconcile the assault with “respect for service and chain of command.”103
Based on VA data, mental health diagnoses associated with MST include PTSD
(55.9 percent of women and 53.3 percent of men), depressive disorders (49.2
percent of women and 37.9 percent of men), and substance use disorders (7
percent of women and 15.3 percent of men).104 Thus, combat’s traditional role
https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodi/649502p.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5VX7-XBX7] [hereinafter DoDI 6495.02].
97. 38 U.S.C. § 1720D(a)(1) (2018); see also INST. FOR VETERAN POLICY, SWORDS TO
PLOWSHARES, MILITARY SEXUAL TRAUMA: UNDERSTANDING PREVALENCE, RESOURCES AND
CONSIDERATIONS
TO
CARE
4
(2015),
https://www.swords-to-plowshares.org/wpcontent/uploads/Military-Sexual-Trauma-Understanding-2015.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DV54-8YZ3]
[hereinafter SWORDS TO PLOWSHARES, MILITARY SEXUAL TRAUMA] (citing § 1720D(a)(1)).
98. Evan R. Seamone & David M. Traskey, Maximizing VA Benefits for Survivors of Military
Sexual Trauma: A Practical Guide for Survivors and Their Advocates, 26 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 343,
344 (2014).
99. SWORDS TO PLOWSHARES, MILITARY SEXUAL TRAUMA, supra note 97, at 15.
100. Id.; see also Irene Williams & Kunsook Bernstein, Military Sexual Trauma Among U.S.
Female Veterans, 25 ARCHIVES PSYCHIATRIC NURSING 138, 142 (2011) (“PTSD stemming from MST
is perhaps one of the most pressing mental health concerns facing female service members and veterans
today.”).
101. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 28, at 7.
102. SWORDS TO PLOWSHARES, MILITARY SEXUAL TRAUMA, supra note 97, at 6–7.
103. Id. at 6.
104. Id. at 15. With the growing awareness and understanding of mental health conditions facing
servicemembers and veterans, the concept of “moral injury” has emerged to identify the military-unique
experience of trauma, especially MST. See, e.g., id. at 6 (“[M]oral injury [is] the pain that results from
damage to a veteran’s moral foundation. In contrast to [PTSD], which springs from fear, moral injury is
a violation of what veterans consider right or wrong. Transgressions can arise from individual acts of
commission or omission, the behavior of others, or by bearing witness to intense human suffering or the
grotesque aftermath of battle.”); see also Erik D. Masick, Moral Injury and Preventive Law: A
Framework for the Future, 224 MIL. L. REV. 223, 224–25 (2016). Moral beliefs and expectations may
be “culture-based” or “organizational,” such as military culture and organization. Id. at 241. This Article
does not explore the relationship between combat-related or MST stressors and moral injury, see id. at
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as a stressor should be understood as only one of the military-unique stressors.
This broadened understanding of PTSD stressors also helps frame the various
behavioral implications, as discussed next.
B. The Relationship Between PTSD and Misconduct
In May 2017, the Government Accountability Office reported that “62
percent, or 57,141 of the 91,764 servicemembers separated for misconduct from
fiscal years 2011 through 2015 had been diagnosed within the 2 years prior to
separation with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), traumatic brain injury
(TBI), or certain other conditions that could be associated with misconduct.”105
Even though “the military has officially recognized the connection between
service-connected stress conditions and misconduct—both on the battlefield and
in manifestations after troops have returned home—and has urged commanders
to at least consider mental conditions before taking disciplinary action,” such as
issuing other-than-honorable discharges, that recognition has not solved the
problem.106
There is a significant volume of research and scholarship on the connection
between PTSD and behavior, including how PTSD symptoms can look like
misconduct.107 This Article does not go in depth on that research but provides
some context as an anchor to support the overall need for change. For example,
in 2010, a group of scholars discussed “three typologies that closely correspond
to criminal behavior in PTSD sufferers: dissociative reaction, sensation-seeking
syndrome, and depression-suicidal syndrome.”108 These three typologies along
with six other “paradigm reactions among Vietnam veterans with PTSD” were
identified by John P. Wilson and Sheldon D. Zigelbaum.109
Each of the typologies provides a meaningful way to understand the
relationship between PTSD and behavior that may look like misconduct when it
is actually coping behavior. Dissociative reaction is triggered by the environment
in ways that remind the servicemember of the original stress.110 The
servicemember then “enters into what some call ‘survivor mode’” with “typical
physiological symptoms of PTSD such as hyperalertness, hypervigilance, and
excessive nervous system arousal.”111 The person may “go[] on automatic” in
254–61, but recognizes that moral injury may be at play in these contexts. For example, moral injury
may result in behavior that is misinterpreted as misconduct. Coping with moral injury can also result in
“‘maladaptive coping,’ which may manifest as a diminished capacity or willingness to adhere to laws
or values, and ‘can result in behavior that is simultaneously symptomatic and criminal.’” Id. at 248–49
(footnotes omitted).
105. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 24, highlights.
106. Seamone, supra note 86, at 490–92 (citations and emphasis omitted).
107. See, e.g., What is Posttraumatic Stress Disorder?, supra note 78; NAT’L CTR. FOR PTSD,
supra note 78.
108. Burgess, supra note 89, at 65 (emphasis omitted).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 65–66 (citation omitted).
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this state, and for a combat veteran, this could mean “a search-and-destroy
mentality in which his or her automatic reaction is to find and kill any perceived
source of danger.”112 Sensation-seeking syndrome occurs when veterans “seek
out activities that offer a level of danger similar to their combat experiences in
an effort to maintain control over their surroundings.”113 These activities could
be anything from legal skydiving to illegal drug activity.114 Veterans
experiencing sensation-seeking syndrome are “capable of substantial
premeditation” in contrast to veterans experiencing more of a spontaneous
reaction to the environment.115 Depression-suicide syndrome manifests through
“survivor guilt, hopelessness, despondency, and a deep depression.”116 A veteran
may feel guilty for surviving combat, and this syndrome can lead the veteran to
“subconsciously act out his anger through criminal acts,” even going so far as to
seek out “suicide by cop”—engaging in criminal behavior to antagonize law
enforcement to shoot.117
In many cases, “the behavior associated with PTSD and TBI is behavior
that puts servicemembers directly at odds with their commanders and the larger
military culture.”118 Some of the “symptoms associated with PTSD and TBI,
such as poor impulse control, loss of temper, impaired thinking, and poor
exercise of judgment, may appear indistinguishable from the behavior of a
servicemember who has chosen to rebel against the good order and discipline so
necessary to the military’s culture.”119 The National Center for PTSD noted that
veterans may “cope with their PTSD by drinking heavily, using drugs, or
smoking too much.”120 PTSD may be unpredictable, but “studies indicate that
substance abuse is significantly related to PTSD because alcohol or drug use is
a method of coping with intrusive thoughts, nightmares, insomnia, and hyperalertness.”121
112. Id. at 66; see also Chapman, supra note 28, at 15 (“Another associated feature of PTSD is
misconduct, usually in the form of violent acts; in these cases, afflicted [servicemembers] are unable to
transition from ‘survivor mode,’ where aggressiveness and hypervigilance is a necessity, to the relative
calm of garrison life.”).
113. Burgess, supra note 89, at 66.
114. Id. at 66–67.
115. Id. at 67–68.
116. Id. at 68.
117. Id. The National Center for PTSD identifies four types of symptoms for PTSD: “reliving
the event,” “avoiding things that remind you of the event,” “having more negative thoughts and feelings
than before,” and “feeling on edge.” NAT’L CTR. FOR PTSD, UNDERSTANDING PTSD AND PTSD
TREATMENT 5–6 (2019), https://www.ptsd.va.gov/publications/print/understandingptsd_booklet.pdf
[perma.cc/X7HJ-LD4X].
118. Simcox, supra note 26, at 562.
119. Id.
120. NATIONAL CENTER FOR PTSD, UNDERSTANDING PTSD AND SUBSTANCE USE: FOR
VETERANS,
GENERAL
PUBLIC,
FAMILY
AND
FRIENDS,
https://www.ptsd.va.gov/publications/print/sudptsdflyer.pdf [https://perma.cc/WK92-88JY] (“Almost 1
out of every 3 Veterans seeking treatment for [Substance Use Disorder] also have PTSD. More than 1
of every 4 Veterans with PTSD also have SUD.”).
121. Chapman, supra note 28, at 13.
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DoD also recognizes mental health effects related to sexual assault in the
military. Similar to the behaviors associated to combat-related PTSD, MST
survivors may exhibit coping mechanisms that are potentially acts of misconduct
under the UCMJ. Such behaviors include “difficulties with hierarchical
environments” and substance abuse.122 For many MST survivors, the coping
mechanisms lead to “misconduct” under the UCMJ, and “[t]housands of victims
have been pushed out of the service with less-than-honorable discharges, which
can leave them with no or reduced benefits, poor job prospects and a lifetime of
stigma.”123 As the military better understands these stressors and related mental
health conditions, DoD has worked to implement responsive support
mechanisms.
III.
DOD’S RESPONSE TO GROWING MENTAL HEALTH AWARENESS
DoD’s response to mental health issues includes efforts targeted at active
duty military and veterans. DoD developed policy to better care for
servicemembers’ needs while they are on active duty and to carefully consider
mental health conditions as part of the administrative separation process. DoD
also established “liberal consideration” as a policy aimed at correcting past
injustices resulting from commanders regularly discharging servicemembers
under other-than-honorable conditions when their misconduct was related to a
mental health condition. Before discussing liberal consideration in depth, this
Section includes some background on DoD’s other efforts for a more complete
understanding of liberal consideration’s underpinnings.
A. Providing Mental Health Care to Active Duty Servicemembers and
Veterans
DoD has provided guidance and training to educate the military about
mental health issues, support active duty servicemembers, and better equip
leaders to handle mental health issues. For example, Congress required a medical
examination before discharge for any servicemember who “has been deployed
overseas in support of a contingency operation during the previous 24 months”
and had a PTSD or TBI diagnosis or “reasonably allege[d] . . . the influence of
such a condition.”124 The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2013 included multiple provisions supporting mental health care for active duty
servicemembers and veterans.125 Consistent with these changes, the Navy
122. SWORDS TO PLOWSHARES, MILITARY SEXUAL TRAUMA, supra note 97, at 2.
123. Mark Thompson, Military Sexual Assault Victims Discharged After Filing Complaints,
TIME (May 18, 2016), http://time.com/4340321/sexual-assault-military-discharge-women/
[https://perma.cc/7A8H-JNBU].
124. 10 U.S.C. § 1177(a) (2012); see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 28, at 3. For a
brief discussion of DoD’s screening efforts, see Chapman, supra note 28, at 18–21.
125. Pub. L. No. 112-239, § 582, 126 Stat. 1632, 1766 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 1071 note)
(“Comprehensive Policy on Prevention of Suicide Among Members of the Armed Forces”).
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updated its separation policies to require a pre-discharge determination of
whether a diagnosed condition of PTSD or TBI “was a contributing factor” to
misconduct giving rise to separation from service, whether administrative or in
lieu of court martial.126 This decision must be made “by a mental health
professional diagnosing the PTSD or TBI, or a higher-level mental health
professional.”127 The new policy also required a higher-level separation
authority, the Chief of Naval Personnel, to determine the appropriate
discharge.128
In recent years, “the US military has made a concerted effort to improve
how it handles sexual assault cases,”129 including requiring medical
examinations before discharge for servicemembers who were sexually assaulted,
just as it already required for PTSD and TBI cases.130 These “reforms have
provided important additional resources and protections for service members”
who experienced military sexual assault.131 DoD continues to study sexual
assault in the military with its most recent report released in May 2019 and to
implement its Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) Program in
accordance with DoD Instruction 6495.02.132 DoD is also committed to its
Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Strategic Plan, 2017-2021, intended to
improve “organizational culture of dignity and respect where every Service
member is empowered to prevent sexual assault and support victims when crimes
do occur.”133
No matter the cause of the mental health condition, DoD has recognized
that mental health stigma “serves as a key barrier to help-seeking among service
members in need of mental health treatment.”134 In particular, research has
126. MILPERSMAN 1910-702, supra note 50, para. 1(c). The Marine Corps also revised its
separation policies in line with the statute. See U.S. MARINE CORPS, ORDER 1900.16 CH 2, SEPARATION
AND
RETIREMENT
MANUAL
enclosure
1,
para.
6110
(Feb.
15,
2019),
https://www.marines.mil/portals/1/Publications/MCO%201900.16%20CH%202.pdf?ver=2019-02-26080015-447 [https://perma.cc/L9UN-W7KP].
127. MILPERSMAN 1910-702, supra note 50, para. 1(c), at 1.
128. Id. at 2.
129. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 28, at 3.
130. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, Pub. L. No. 114-328, § 524, 130
Stat. 2000, 2116 (2016) (amending 10 U.S.C. § 1177(a) by inserting “, or sexually assaulted,” and “or
based on such sexual assault”).
131. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 28, at 3.
132. See DoDI 6495.02, supra note 96.
133. Ash Carter, Sec’y of Def., Foreword to U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., SEXUAL ASSAULT AND
PREVENTION
AND
RESPONSE
STRATEGIC
PLAN,
2017-2021
(2016),
https://sapr.mil/public/docs/strategic-plan/DoD_SAPR_Strategic_Plan_2017-2021_Signed.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YA7A-7XPB].
134. JOIE D. ACOSTA ET AL., MENTAL HEALTH STIGMA IN THE MILITARY 12 (2014),
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR400/RR426/RAND_RR426.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Z27Y-C5EZ]. General Robert B. Neller, Commandant of the Marine Corps, wrote a
letter addressing Marine suicide:
[I]t is time we have honest and frank conversations about mental stress, trauma, suicide, and more
importantly, mental wellness . . . .
. ...
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demonstrated that “men perceive greater stigma associated with seeking help
than women do,” and that men “seek[] care as a last resort because they are
expected to be stoic, controlled, and self-sufficient.”135 In the military, these
expectations are even more entrenched given the norms of military life and
“values of unit culture (e.g., shared mission, leave no soldier behind).”136 The
National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2013 also recognized this
stigma by requiring a suicide prevention policy that “[i]ncrease[s] awareness
among members of the Armed Forces about mental health conditions and the
stigma associated with mental health conditions and mental health care.”137
More recently, former VA Secretary David Shulkin implemented an
initiative to focus on mental health issues for veterans. Secretary Shulkin’s
policy gave other-than-honorably discharged veterans the ability to “receive care
for their mental health emergency for an initial period of up to 90 days.”138 That
policy had some positive effects, at least according to reports that more than three
thousand veterans accessed that mental health care.139 In early 2018, the Trump
administration approved a “way for servicemembers to be enrolled automatically
with the [VA] for mental health care when they leave the military.”140 This new
policy responded to the increasing rate of suicide for veterans and, in particular,
to “the highest risk for veteran suicide,” which occurs during the twelve months
immediately following service.141 Congress also passed new legislation in March
2018 requiring the VA to provide increased mental and behavioral health care to
veterans with other-than-honorable discharges who served in certain operational
capacities (e.g., combat) or who were victims of sexual assault.142
Even so, for many veterans already discharged with an other-thanhonorable characterization, these responses have had little effect and have been

. . . Most of us are very comfortable talking about our physical fitness and the mental hardening required
to perform as our Nation’s sentinels. We are less comfortable discussing mental and spiritual wellness.
We can no longer afford to set those conversations aside because we don’t think they are important
enough or we are too embarrassed that it might be perceived as weakness.
David H. Berger (@CMC_MarineCorps), TWITTER (May 21, 2019, 11:01 AM),
https://twitter.com/CMC_MarineCorps/status/1130866252321370112
[https://perma.cc/37UHGNNH].
135. ACOSTA ET AL., supra note 134, at 12 (citation omitted).
136. Id.; see also Chapman, supra note 28, at 23 (“In the minds of some Soldiers, mental health
issues, such as PTSD, are shameful, weak conditions.”).
137. Pub. L. No. 112-239, § 582(b)(1), 126 Stat. 1632, 1766 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 1071 note).
138. News Release, U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, VA Secretary Formalizes Expansion of
Emergency Mental Health Care to Former Service Members with Other-than-Honorable Discharges
(June
27,
2017),
https://www.va.gov/OPA/pressrel/includes/viewPDF.cfm?id=2923
[https://perma.cc/M356-S4X4].
139. Nikki Wentling, Trump Signs Order to Improve Mental Health Care for New Vets, STARS
& STRIPES (Jan. 9, 2018), https://www.stripes.com/news/trump-signs-order-to-improve-mental-healthcare-for-new-vets-1.505865 [https://perma.cc/D3A3-42FR].
140. Id.; see also Exec. Order No. 13,822, 83 Fed. Reg. 1513 (Jan. 9, 2018).
141. Wentling, supra note 139.
142. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018, § 1712I, Pub. L. No. 115-141, 132 Stat. 348, 826–
28 (codified as amended at 38 U.S.C. § 1720I).
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poorly implemented.143 Furthermore, “virtually nothing has been done to address
the ongoing harm done to thousands of veterans who reported sexual assault
before reforms took place” and were discharged under various other-thanhonorable conditions.144 While DoD’s efforts may benefit current
servicemembers and future veterans, they do little to help the thousands already
discharged with an other-than-honorable discharge for behavior likely related to
a mental health condition.
B. Requiring Liberal Consideration Toward Upgrading Other-thanHonorable Discharges for Veterans with Mental Health Conditions
For the thousands of veterans already discharged under other-thanhonorable conditions due to a mental health condition, potential relief is
available through seeking a discharge upgrade. In recognizing the connections
between mental health and misconduct, DoD issued policy guidance to military
records correction and discharge review boards to govern decisions involving
mental health conditions.145 The policy guidance requires the boards to give
“liberal consideration” to discharge upgrade requests involving mental health
conditions including those related to PTSD, TBI, sexual assault, and sexual
harassment.146
Liberal consideration is a way to view a servicemember’s behavior as a
response to PTSD, TBI, or other mental health conditions, rather than as a
voluntary or intentional violation of the UCMJ.147 Liberal consideration
explicitly recognizes that there are conditions and experiences that excuse,
explain, or mitigate what seems to be bad behavior and that the military needs a
new approach to get past the status quo of rejecting most upgrade requests.148
This Article focuses on the current iteration of liberal consideration, but this
Section first provides some background leading up to the current policy.
1. Early Liberal Consideration: The Hagel Memo
The liberal consideration policy was in part a response to a federal lawsuit
seeking redress for Vietnam veterans with PTSD who were denied relief when
143. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 24, at 16, 22 (noting that “two of
the four military services’ policies are inconsistent with DOD policies related to screening
servicemembers for PTSD and TBI prior to separation” and that “the Army and Marine Corps may not
have adhered to their own screening, training, and counseling policies”).
144. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 28, at 3.
145. In direct response to the lawsuit involving Vietnam veterans with PTSD and discharges
well outside the fifteen-year limit for discharge review boards to consider, the initial memo on liberal
consideration was specifically directed to the military boards for correction of military/naval records,
and it recognized solely PTSD. See Hagel Memo, supra note 39. Clarifying guidance later included the
discharge review boards and expanded the type of claims to include mental health conditions related to
PTSD, TBI, sexual assault, and sexual harassment. Kurta Memo, supra note 39, attach. 1.
146. Kurta Memo, supra note 39, attach. 1.
147. See Hagel Memo, supra note 39; Kurta Memo, supra note 39.
148. See Hagel Memo, supra note 39; Kurta Memo, supra note 39.
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they sought discharge upgrades.149 Secretary Chuck Hagel released the original
liberal consideration memo (known as “the Hagel Memo” or “PTSD Upgrade
Memo” in veterans’ advocates circles). Liberal consideration was intended to
help Vietnam veterans get upgrades based on “previously unrecognized Post
Traumatic Stress Disorder” because PTSD “was not recognized as a diagnosis at
the time of service and, in many cases, diagnoses were not made until decades
after service was completed.”150 DoD later clarified that liberal consideration
applies to all veterans (not just Vietnam veterans) and to both records correction
and discharge review boards, despite the Hagel Memo’s specific reference to
Vietnam veterans and sole address to the records correction boards.151
The liberal consideration policy relaxes evidentiary standards for discharge
upgrades and mandates a liberal view of evidence. PTSD or PTSD-related
conditions “will be considered potential mitigating factors in the misconduct that
caused the under other than honorable conditions characterization of service.”152
The policy requires boards to balance any mitigation with serious misconduct
and to “exercise caution.”153 Liberal consideration also eliminates PTSD as “a
likely cause of premeditated misconduct” and requires caution in considering the
causal relationship between PTSD and misconduct.154
Liberal consideration was codified at 10 U.S.C. § 1553(d) for the discharge
review boards.155 By statute, liberal consideration that a mental health condition
“potentially contributed to the circumstances resulting in the discharge”156 is
required for two categories of cases:
1) cases involving deployment “in support of a contingency
operation” where the servicemember, “at any time after such
deployment, was diagnosed by a physician, clinical
psychologist, or psychiatrist as experiencing post-traumatic
stress disorder or traumatic brain injury as a consequence of

149. See Andrew Tilghman, DoD Willing to Reconsider Discharges of Vietnam Vets with PTSD,
MIL. TIMES (Sept. 3, 2014), https://www.militarytimes.com/news/pentagon-congress/2014/09/03/dodwilling-to-reconsider-discharges-of-vietnam-vets-with-ptsd [https://perma.cc/BS9H-ZNJ9] (“The
Pentagon’s new rule comes in response to a federal lawsuit filed on behalf of several veterans . . . that
claimed the Defense Department was wrongfully denying discharge upgrade applications from veterans
with claims and evidence of PTSD.”); see also Complaint, Monk v. Mabus, No. 3:14-cv-00260 (WWE)
(D. Conn. 2014).
150. Hagel Memo, supra note 39, at 1.
151. Memorandum from Brad Carson, Acting Principal Deputy Under Sec’y of Def., to
Secretaries of the Military Dept’s (Feb. 24, 2016), https://ctveteranslegal.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/10/carson.pdf [https://perma.cc/NBB3-AZDQ].
152. Hagel Memo, supra note 39, attach. at 1.
153. Id.
154. Id. attach. at 2.
155. This legislative change satisfied one of the Unfinished Business report’s recommendations
to codify “liberal standards of consideration for evidence of PTSD.” See SIDIBE & UNGER, supra note
26, at 9. Congress did not, however, go as far as to codify “a presumption of record correction for
veterans with documented PTSD,” as the report urged. See id.
156. 10 U.S.C. § 1553(d)(3)(A)(ii) (2018).
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that deployment”;157 and
2) cases involving PTSD or TBI “related to combat or military
sexual trauma.”158
In these cases, the boards are required to “review the case with liberal
consideration to the former member that post-traumatic stress disorder or
traumatic brain injury potentially contributed to the circumstances resulting in
the discharge” of a lesser characterization.159 This statute also established the
requirement to expedite decisions in cases involving PTSD or TBI160 and to
include on the review board in all cases from the two categories defined above
“a clinical psychologist or psychiatrist, or a physician with training on mental
health issues connected with post traumatic stress disorder or traumatic brain
injury (as applicable).”161
The overall thrust of the liberal consideration policy is that the boards
should grant more upgrades to veterans with mental health conditions because
those conditions mitigate their misconduct.162 There was an initial increase in
upgrades after the boards first implemented liberal consideration. A joint study
of the Army Board for the Correction of Military Records (ABCMR) for the first
year post-Hagel Memo determined that “[t]he overall grant rate for all veterans
applying for PTSD-based discharge upgrades . . . [rose] more than twelve-fold
from 3.7% in 2013 to 45%.”163 Vietnam veterans made up 67 percent of
applicants and had a much higher grant rate than other veterans.164 The ABCMR
granted seventy-four out of one hundred applications for veterans with a PTSD
diagnosis and zero of fifty-four for veterans who did not submit evidence of any
157. Id. § 1553(d)(1)(A).
158. Id. § 1553(d)(3)(B).
159. Id. § 1553(d)(3)(A)(ii).
160. Id. § 1553(d)(2).
161. Id. § 1553(d)(1)(A).
162. See Lisa Ferdinando, DoD Clarifies Liberal Consideration for Veterans’ Discharge
Upgrade
Requests,
U.S.
DEP’T
OF
DEF.
(Aug.
28,
2017),
https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/1292904/dod-clarifies-liberal-considerationfor-veterans-discharge-upgrade-requests [https://perma.cc/EQ6B-BVCW] (noting that liberal
consideration is intended to “ease the burden on veterans”); see also Dep’t of Def., DoD Clarifies
Discharge
Upgrade
Requests
00:14–00:35
(Aug.
24,
2017),
YOUTUBE,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=syMRP0kmlLU (Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Reggie Yager,
acting director of legal policy in the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and
Readiness, explaining that liberal consideration intends to give veterans “a reasonable opportunity and
that the burdens are not unreasonable on the veteran to be able to establish when in fact [their] basis for
discharge was precipitated by things outside the veteran’s control like mental health conditions or posttraumatic stress. And so this clarifying guidance is intended to ease those burdens and make it easier for
an applicant to establish that.”).
163. SIDIBE & UNGER, supra note 26, at 2. The inadequate implementation was also documented
and at issue in Amended Complaint, Kennedy v. Esper, No. 3:16-cv-02010-WWE (D. Conn. Apr. 17,
2017).
164. SIDIBE & UNGER, supra note 26, at 2. Of course, part of the high percentage for Vietnam
veteran applicants here is that current-era veterans go to the discharge review board first, but Vietnam
veterans can only seek redress through the records correction boards due to the fifteen-year statute of
limitations at the discharge review boards. 10 U.S.C. § 1553(a).
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diagnosis.165 This report focused on the ABCMR because of the Army’s
“comprehensive response” to a FOIA request, a response that included “copies
of 164 post-PTSD Upgrade Memo decisions on PTSD-based discharge upgrade
applications.”166
Despite some increase in grant rates, the boards did not fully implement
liberal consideration. Yale Law School’s Legal Services Clinic filed two class
action lawsuits documenting this lack of implementation, one against the
Army167 and one against the Navy.168 In both cases, the named plaintiffs
explained how their misconduct was the result of a diagnosed mental health
condition and that they were entitled to an upgrade under the Hagel Memo’s
liberal consideration policy because of their mental health condition and its
nexus to their behavior.169 In a major win for veterans, the court certified a class
in both cases.170 Both cases are docketed to move forward, but there are no
decisions on the merits yet.171
165. SIDIBE & UNGER, supra note 26, at 2.
166. Id. at 5.
167. Amended Complaint, Kennedy, supra note 163.
168. Complaint, Manker v. Spencer, 329 F.R.D. 110 (D. Conn. Mar. 2, 2018).
169. In Kennedy v. Esper, the case against the Army, the court certified a class of Army veterans
of the Iraq and Afghanistan era who:
a) were discharged with a less-than[-]Honorable service characterization (this
includes General and Other than Honorable discharges from the Army, Army
Reserve, and Army National Guard, but not Bad Conduct or Dishonorable
discharges);
b) have not received discharge upgrades to Honorable; and
c) have diagnoses of PTSD or PTSD-related conditions or records documenting
one or more symptoms of PTSD or PTSD-related conditions at the time of
discharge attributable to their military service under the Hagel Memo
standards of liberal and special consideration.
No. 3:16-cv-02010-WWE, 2018 WL 6727353, at *1 (D. Conn. Dec. 21, 2018). And in Manker, the case
against the Navy, the court certified a class of Navy and Marine Corps veterans of the Iraq and
Afghanistan era who:
(a) were discharged from the Navy, Navy Reserves, Marine Corps, or Marine Corps
Reserve with less-than-Honorable statuses, including General and Other-thanHonorable discharges but excluding Bad Conduct or Dishonorable discharges;
(b) have not received upgrades of their discharge statuses to Honorable from the
NDRB; and
(c) have diagnoses of PTSD, TBI, or other related mental health conditions, or records
documenting one or more symptoms of PTSD, TBI, or other related mental health
conditions at the time of discharge, attributable to their military service under the
Hagel Memo standards of liberal or special consideration.
329 F.R.D. at 123.
170. See supra note 169.
171. In the case against the Army, both named plaintiffs received upgrades to Honorable from
the Army after the court remanded their cases to the Army Discharge Review Board. Kennedy, 2018
WL 6727353, at *2. In rejecting the Army’s argument for mootness, the court explained in its decision
certifying the class that even though the named plaintiffs received relief, the Army “has not demonstrated
assurance that there exists no reasonable expectation that the ADRB will continue to disregard the Hagel
Memo PTSD directive in its . . . review of discharge upgrade applications.” Id. at *4. The court also
denied the Army’s motion to dismiss. 2019 WL 7290933, at *2 (Jan. 9, 2019). A judicial settlement
conference was scheduled for January 2020. Posting of Michael Wishnie, michael.wishnie@yale.edu,
to veteransclinics@lists.wm.edu (Nov. 30, 2019) (on file with author). In the case against the Navy, the
court denied the Navy’s motion to dismiss and granted a partial remand. Manker v. Spencer, No. 3:18-
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2. Liberal Consideration Today: The Kurta Memo
Approximately three years after the Hagel Memo and various reports of the
boards’ inadequate and inconsistent implementation of liberal consideration, the
Kurta Memo renewed and expanded liberal consideration for veterans with
mental health conditions.172 Deputy Under Secretary Kurta called for “greater
uniformity amongst the review boards” and for “veterans [to] be better informed
about how to achieve relief in these types of cases.”173 Kurta went on to
recognize that “there are frequently limited records for the boards to consider,
often through no fault of the veteran,” rendering cases involving “[i]nvisible
wounds” difficult.174 The Kurta Memo urges the boards to consider each unique
case “and afford each veteran a reasonable opportunity for relief even if the
sexual assault or sexual harassment was unreported, or the mental health
condition was not diagnosed until years later.”175 The memo’s four-page
attachment offers the most substantive guidance to date, with a series of
questions for boards to consider.176 The attachment includes an eleven-item nonexclusive list of how to liberally consider upgrade requests.177 For example, the
guidance recognizes that “[m]ental health conditions, including PTSD; TBI;
sexual assault; and sexual harassment impact veterans in many intimate ways,
are often undiagnosed or diagnosed years afterwards, and are frequently
unreported.”178
The Kurta Memo reinforces the Hagel Memo with additional guidance
based on DoD’s review of discharge upgrade policy and public comment.179 The
Kurta Memo reflects DoD’s commitment to easing the burden on veterans and
“ensur[ing] fair and consistent standards of review” for veterans seeking a
discharge upgrade based on a mental health condition, sexual assault, or sexual
harassment.180 The entire veteran-favorable policy is grounded in leniency; a
Pentagon official described the clarifying guidance as follows:
It’s in our interest to ensure those who have suffered injustice or believe
cv-372 (CSH), 2019 WL 5846828, at *20–21 (D. Conn. Nov. 7, 2019). Though the court remanded the
cases for the two named plaintiffs, Manker and Doe, the court noted “there is neither a basis for, nor
justice in staying, the entire class action while that limited remand goes forward.” Id. at *19. For the
partial remand, the court ordered the NDRB to “issue its decisions following the consideration on
remand not later than March 7, 2020.” Id. at *20. The parties are directed to file the decisions with the
court, and the court stayed the proceedings pending those decisions but only in regard to Manker and
Doe. Id. A judicial settlement conference was scheduled for February 2020. Posting of Michael Wishnie,
supra.
172. Kurta Memo, supra note 39.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. See id. attach.
177. Id. attach. ¶ 26.
178. Id. attach. ¶ 26(e).
179. Kurta Memo, supra note 39; see also Wentling, supra note 35 (“After Hagel issued his
memo three years ago, observers said the guidance was applied differently based on military branch,
and veterans’ applications for upgrades grew into a backlog of cases.”).
180. Kurta Memo, supra note 39.
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their discharge is unfair, that they have a reasonable opportunity . . . to
establish the basis for their discharge was precipitated by things outside
their control. This clarifying guidance is intended to ease those burdens
and make it easier for an applicant to establish that.181
To that end, the Kurta Memo provides the boards a four-question analytical
framework to implement liberal consideration:
a. Did the veteran have a condition or experience that may excuse
or mitigate the discharge?
b. Did that condition exist/experience occur during military
service?
c. Does that condition or experience actually excuse or mitigate
the discharge?
d. Does that condition or experience outweigh the discharge?182
The Kurta Memo identifies categories of evidence, in addition to or in the
absence of a medical diagnosis that the boards can use to establish the existence
of a veteran’s mental health condition. The Kurta Memo also addresses the nexus
issue by directing boards to give liberal consideration to “[c]onditions or
experiences that may reasonably have existed at the time of discharge” and to
consider those conditions or experiences as “excusing or mitigating the
discharge.”183 It implicitly suggests that there should be many cases that merit
relief based on liberal consideration, stating that “[i]n some cases, the severity of
misconduct may outweigh any mitigation from mental health conditions.”184
This language limits the number of cases; although not quantified, “some” does
not suggest “most.” The guidance is permissive, indicating that even severe
misconduct may be mitigated. The Kurta Memo further allows room for the
boards to excuse premeditated conduct in line with the sensation-seeking and
depression-suicide syndromes.185 The Kurta Memo also explains that mental
health conditions “inherently affect one’s behaviors and choices causing
veterans to think and behave differently than might otherwise be expected.”186
Reflecting the understanding of how mental health conditions affect
behavior, liberal consideration sets forth a lens through which the boards should
view discharge upgrade requests in a way that is favorable to the veteran. For
example, the Kurta Memo directly addresses what to do about an absence of
181. Wentling, supra note 35 (quoting Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Reggie Yagel, Under
Secretary Kurta’s point of contact in the Office of Legal Policy).
182. Kurta Memo, supra note 39, attach. ¶ 2.
183. Id. attach. ¶ 16.
184. Id. attach. ¶ 18.
185. The Memo does not mention these syndromes but implicitly relies on the idea that mental
health conditions may mitigate even premeditated misconduct. The Kurta Memo specifically mentions
“substance-seeking behavior” and “self-medicat[ion]” as potentially mitigating misconduct. The Kurta
Memo advises boards to “exercise caution,” but does not give any guidance on how to exercise that
caution or how to evaluate “the causal relationship between asserted conditions or experiences and
premeditated misconduct.” Kurta Memo, supra note 39, attach. ¶ 19.
186. Id., attach. ¶ 26(e).
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medical evidence. Instead of using the lack of evidence to deny relief, the boards
must consider the “veteran’s testimony alone, oral or written.”187 That
testimony—alone—can “establish the existence of a condition or experience,
that the condition or experience existed during or was aggravated by military
service, and that the condition or experience excuses or mitigates the
discharge.”188 Under liberal consideration, the boards are required to assess the
veteran’s testimony in applying the four-question framework.189 Of course, the
boards should still make a credibility determination about a veteran’s testimony
and evaluate that testimony in the context of any conflicting evidence in the
record.190 The Kurta Memo does not establish a guaranteed path to upgrade, but
intends to make the path easier for veterans.
The Kurta Memo also acknowledges that “[m]ental health conditions,
including PTSD; TBI; sexual assault; and sexual harassment . . . are often
undiagnosed or diagnosed years afterwards, and are frequently unreported.”191
Under liberal consideration, the boards are required to shift the interpretation of
a lack of evidence and see it as potentially consistent with mental health
conditions. The Kurta Memo also specifically connects misconduct and mental
health conditions to broaden the way the boards have historically viewed
misconduct. Misconduct itself may be evidence of a mental health condition, and
“[a] veteran asserting a mental health condition without a corresponding
diagnosis of such condition from a licensed psychiatrist or psychologist, will
receive liberal consideration of evidence that may support the existence of such
a condition.”192 Thus, the lack of a diagnosis should not stand as an automatic
bar to upgrade.
Of course, implementation of liberal consideration does not mean a 100
percent grant rate.193 But despite the potential for sweeping change194 in how the
boards view misconduct in relation to mental health conditions, liberal
consideration has not yet had a transformative effect on the number of discharge
upgrades or on the boards’ reasoning in their decisions. The next part discusses
in detail how the NDRB, as a representative example of all of the discharge
review boards, has failed to implement liberal consideration.

187. Id. attach. ¶ 7.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. See 32 C.F.R. § 70.8(e)(6)(ii)(B)(2) (2018) (providing that boards shall evaluate testimony
for being “sufficiently credible”).
191. Kurta Memo, supra note 39, attach. ¶ 26(d).
192. Id. attach. ¶ 11.
193. Id. attach. ¶ 26(k) (“Liberal consideration does not mandate an upgrade.”).
194. Wentling, supra note 35 (“The Defense Department on Monday issued a sweeping policy
change to afford more leeway to veterans seeking upgrades to their other-than-honorable discharges.”).
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IV.
KICKED AGAIN: THE NDRB’S FAILURE TO IMPLEMENT LIBERAL
CONSIDERATION
Through liberal consideration, DoD sought to respond to the historic
problems for servicemembers seeking discharge upgrade requests. DoD has
attempted a significant shift in recognizing how mental health conditions
mitigate what was categorized as misconduct in an effort to provide long overdue
recognition and relief to veterans. Recent statistics from the NDRB suggest that
the shift has not taken effect. As part of a recent conference on veterans’ legal
issues, the President of the NDRB shared the following statistics for FY 2019:
Upgrade requests involving
PTSD:
Upgrade requests involving
TBI:
Upgrade requests involving
MST:
Upgrade requests involving
Mental Health:

64 Cases / 10 Upgrades (17 percent)195
6 Cases / 1 Upgrade (17 percent)
21 Cases / 2 Upgrades (10 percent)
90 Cases / 14 Upgrades (16 percent)196

These rates are low, and they are consistent with the low rates of upgrade over
the past few years under liberal consideration.197
Of course, liberal consideration provides no guarantee and does not require
that a veteran receive an upgrade. Yet, the whole basis for liberal consideration
suggests that upgrades involving PTSD, TBI, MST, and other mental health
conditions should be granted liberally toward the goal of providing “a reasonable

195. Note the data do not specify whether the upgrades were full or partial, and it is unlikely that
all of these upgrades provided full relief.
196. Robert Powers, President, NDRB, Sec’y of the Navy, Council of Review Bds., NDRB
Presentation to Veterans Legal Assistance Conference of 2019, at slide 3 (June 7, 2019) (slides on file
with author).
197. According to the President of the NDRB in a presentation given in 2018, the grant rate for
Navy discharge upgrade requests to which liberal consideration applied has been low. In 2015, there
were 116 “liberal consideration claims” and nineteen were granted (16 percent). Robert Powers,
President, NDRB, Sec’y of the Navy, Council of Review Bds., NDRB Presentation to National Law
School Veterans Clinic Consortium for the 2018 NLSVCC Conference, at 12 (Feb. 28–Mar. 1, 2018)
(on file with author). Taking a closer look at the month-by-month breakdown, the low rate of upgrades
is stark. See id. In April 2015, only two of thirteen were granted; and in June, only five of thirty-four
were granted. Id. In 2016 and 2017, the grant rate remained low: 16 percent in 2016 and a decline to 14
percent in 2017. Id. The grant rate for Marine Corps discharge upgrade requests to which liberal
consideration applied was also low, although there was a jump in 2017. See id. In 2015 and 2016, the
upgrade rate was 15 percent and 14 percent. Id. In 2017, that jumped to 27 percent. Id. In the first two
quarters of FY 2018, the grant rates remained low. See Powers, supra note 36, at 3. For Navy PTSD
cases, only five out of twenty-eight received an upgrade (18 percent) and for Navy mental health cases,
only nine out of fifty-one received an upgrade (18 percent). Id. For Marine Corps PTSD cases, twentysix of seventy-two received an upgrade (36 percent) and for Marine Corps mental health cases, nineteen
of fifty received an upgrade (38 percent). Id.
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opportunity for relief.”198 And to the extent liberal consideration was a response
to past low grant rates due to inadequacies in recognizing mental health issues
and understanding how mental health affects behavior, it is reasonable to expect
to see higher rates of discharge upgrades.199
Despite the liberal consideration policy that mandated changes in how the
boards review cases involving invisible wounds, the NDRB seems to reach
decisions not to upgrade in the same way it did before liberal consideration. The
NDRB decisions even use the same language as pre-liberal consideration
decisions, further suggesting the Board’s lack of engagement with the Kurta
Memo’s substantive guidance about evaluating evidence liberally within the
four-question framework. There are various thematic ways that liberal
consideration has not been fully or consistently implemented based on a review
of the Board’s decisions.200 These themes represent shortcomings in both the
policy itself and in the Board’s implementation of liberal consideration.
198. Kurta Memo, supra note 39.
199. The liberal consideration policy did not change the standards for an upgrade; those
standards remain equity and propriety. Instead, liberal consideration requires the boards to consider the
facts liberally and with an understanding of how facts may establish a mental health condition and a
nexus between a mental health condition and what may appear to be misconduct. Thus, the expectation
for an increased grant rate is not based on a change in the legal standards for upgrade, but a change in
how the boards consider the facts to meet those standards. See George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The
Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4 (1984) (discussing the potential to wrongly
assume a “rate of plaintiff verdicts to be an accurate measure of the influence of a legal standard” in the
absence of “litigated disputes [that are] representative of the entire class of underlying disputes”); supra
note 169 and accompanying text (describing the two classes certified as veterans with mental health
diagnoses who should have been upgraded to Honorable discharges—or who at least warranted liberal
consideration).
200. Prior to April 2019, NDRB decisions were available in an online public reading room. In
April 2019, the reading room was removed, and there was no information provided regarding its return.
While the reading room was down, the online Boards of Review Reading Rooms webpage included the
following note near the top:
The Army, Air Force, Navy/Marine Corps, and Coast Guard Review Boards decisional
documents normally published in the Department of Defense Reading Room have
temporarily been removed to conduct a quality assurance review. We will update this
webpage when we have a better estimate[] of when the decisional documents will again
be available.
Boards of Review Reading Rooms, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., https://boards.law.af.mil/index.htm
[perma.cc/DC7L-MJU8].
Litigation in early 2020 spurred the Pentagon to “agree[] to promptly make all past decisions of the
[boards] publicly available.” Press Release, Nat’l Veterans Legal Servs. Program, In Response to
NVLSP Lawsuit, Pentagon Swiftly Agrees to Promptly Make All DRB and Correction Board Decisions
Publicly Available (Jan. 17, 2020), https://www.nvlsp.org/news-and-events/press-releases/in-responseto-nvlsp-lawsuit-pentagon-swiftly-agrees-to-promptly-make-all-d [https://perma.cc/SE3T-S5DE]. The
Pentagon promised to post all old decisions (pre-April 2019) by February 14, 2020. Id. But that did not
happen. For example, as of February 15, 2020, the NDRB had only one folder of decisions available.
U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., Naval Discharge Review Board (DRB), BOARDS OF REVIEW READING ROOMS,
https://boards.law.af.mil/NAVY_DRB.htm. The current reading room announcement states that the
decisions since October 1998 are included in the reading room, but that some “documents have been
temporarily removed to conduct a quality assurance review.” Boards of Review Reading Rooms, supra.
Early on in my research for this project, my research assistant, Heidi Weimer, created a database of
decisions as an alternative to the closed reading room. This database is limited to the decisions I
downloaded in early 2019 before the reading room disappeared, but a partial database was better than
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A. (Over)Reliance on the Presumption of Government Regularity
By regulation, the Board presumes “regularity in the conduct of
governmental affairs,” stating “this presumption can be applied in any review
unless there is substantial credible evidence to rebut the presumption.”201 The
entire scheme of liberal consideration is founded on the realization that the
military was “doing it wrong” when it comes to discharging servicemembers for
misconduct when that misconduct was the result of a mental health condition.202
Thus, to the extent the presumption is an often-used default basis to deny upgrade
requests, it is inconsistent with the underlying basis for liberal consideration. The
presumption of regularity assumes the original decisions were correct, lawful,
and in good faith,203 but liberal consideration mandates review outside that lens
to fully and fairly evaluate whether a mental health condition mitigated behavior
previously identified as misconduct.204 Continuing to rely on the presumption of
regularity is one way the Board maintains its traditional approach of merely
rubber-stamping the command-level discharge decisions rather than fully
engaging in liberal consideration.
In many cases, the Board ignores the recognition of past failures that gave
rise to liberal consideration and instead continues to use the government’s
“presumption of regularity in the conduct of its affairs” to justify rejections of
discharge upgrade requests without fully engaging in the principles of liberal
consideration. The conflict between liberal consideration and the presumption of
government regularity is not specifically addressed in the Kurta Memo. Without
addressing the conflict, the NDRB continues to rely on the presumption as a
default justification for denying upgrade requests.

no database. The database is available at NDRB Decisions (Shared), supra note 38. The database is
intended to make the decisions available and organized in a way that will provide helpful information
to future applicants. Giving future applicants better guidance on how to be successful is part of the
reporting requirement, but as of now, there is little an applicant can learn about how to be successful.
Even now that the public reading room is again available, there is a limited search capability and no way
to download a batch of decisions.
201. 32 C.F.R. § 724.211 (2018).
202. See Hagel Memo, supra note 39 (explaining the impetus of the policy as the lack of
recognition of PTSD as a basis for discharge upgrade).
203. See Edward C. Segura, President, AFDRB, and Robert Powers, President, NDRB, Inside
the Discharge Review Boards, at 4 (Mar. 20-21, 2019), http://www.umt.edu/law/files/events/10_Insidethe-Discharge-Review-Boards.pdf [https://perma.cc/MVP4-QDDF] (emphasizing Air Force Discharge
Review Board’s presumption that the “military discharged its duties correctly/lawfully/in good faith”);
see also infra Part V (discussing how the Board views Honorable within a limited construct of how
commanders assessed it at the time of discharge).
204. On June 7, 2019, as part of a panel presentation, NDRB President Powers said that liberal
consideration and presumption of government regularity are not mutually exclusive, but rather are just
two different standards. But they are at least partially mutually exclusive, as liberal consideration was
promulgated in part due to problematic government decision-making in discharge decisions. Notes from
Presentation by Robert Powers, President, NDRB, Sec’y of the Navy, Council of Review Bds., NDRB
Presentation to Veterans Legal Assistance Conference of 2019 (June 7, 2019) (on file with author)
[hereinafter Notes from Powers Presentation] (“[P]resumption of regularity and liberal consideration do
not equal mutually exclusive.”).
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For example, in the case of a former Marine who requested relief due to
PTSD and TBI as mitigating factors for his behavior involving drugs, the Board
relied on the presumption of government regularity to justify denying relief.205
The veteran’s service record documented three deployments, one in 2005 in
support of Operation Iraqi Freedom and two in 2012 and 2013 in support of
Operation Enduring Freedom.206 In this particular case, the veteran was charged
with a felony later reduced to a misdemeanor related to marijuana possession and
intent to manufacture.207 This felony charge led to the veteran’s discharge.208 In
his upgrade request, he asked the Board to consider the underlying mental health
reasons for his behavior, consistent with liberal consideration.209
However, with only a cursory mention of the veteran’s assertion that his
PTSD and TBI mitigated his misconduct, the Board noted the presumption of
regularity and the veteran’s burden to overcome the presumption with
“substantial and credible evidence.”210 The Board acknowledged the veteran’s
statement that his mental health condition was the cause of his misconduct, but
then rejected that connection as insufficient to overcome the presumption on the
basis of the lack of evidence. The Board described the veteran’s actions as
“conscious decisions to violate the tenants [sic] of honorable and faithful
service,” and denied relief.211
Even if the Board’s decision was a reasonable result based on the extent of
the veteran’s involvement with drugs, the Kurta Memo demands liberal
consideration before reaching that decision. For example, the Kurta Memo
specifically recognizes “inability of the individual to conform . . . behavior to the
expectations of the military,” and “substance abuse” as evidence of a mental
health condition and the type of behavior that can be mitigated by mental health
conditions.212 Liberal consideration recognizes even misconduct itself as
evidence of PTSD or TBI, yet in this case, the Board does not appear to consider
how PTSD and TBI may have explained the veteran’s behavior.
Viewing the veteran’s request with the heavily government-favored
presumption of regularity means that the Board is not taking account of all the
research that shows that PTSD and TBI “may result in a series of cognitive,
behavioral, and mood changes impacting an individual’s ability to function in
205. NDRB No. MD17-01353 (on file with author).
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. For other examples of cases where the Board relied on the presumption to deny relief,
see NDRB No. ND18-00471 (denying relief when the government’s presumption was not overcome by
“substantial and credible evidence” even though evidence included post-service documentation of PTSD
and the veteran’s own statement that he suffered PTSD); NDRB No. ND18-00171 (ignoring the blatant
relationship between the veteran’s reported and documented MST and the DUI that occurred on the
same day in context of the presumption of government regularity to deny relief).
212. Kurta Memo, supra note 39, attach. ¶ 5.
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society,” with “some of those changes includ[ing] poor attention, memory
difficulties, depressed mood and rapid fluctuations in mood, poor impulse
control, and disregard for social norms.”213 Research like this is what led to
policy guidance for the boards to “fully and carefully consider every petition
based on PTSD brought by each veteran.”214 Yet the President of the NDRB
freely and earnestly admits that NDRB members are biased in favor of
commanders’ original decisions and typically think that the veteran probably
“got what they deserved.”215 This position is consistent with the Council of
Review Board’s statement that “the Department of the Navy, in issuing a
discharge will always presume it was correct in that action.”216 The Board
members are typically Navy and Marine Corps officers—often former
commanders—who see the same “misbehaviors” they review as board
members.217 Commanders play a “central disciplinarian role”218 in maintaining
good order and discipline, and board members may be continuing that role in
denying relief or merely deferring to their peers in that role.
Liberal consideration—though the policy guidance does not explicitly say
so—required the Board to be open-minded in reviewing this veteran’s case,
rather than blinded by the presumption of government regularity. That
presumption effectively blocked the Board from fairly evaluating whether the
veteran’s mental health condition mitigated his involvement in drugs. Given his
fourteen years of service—including a previous period of honorable service—
and three deployments, it is reasonable in the sphere of liberal consideration to
view his involvement with drugs as unusual and possibly connected to a mental
health condition. Yet, by focusing on the presumption of government regularity
instead of potential mitigation, the Board did not appear to consider that the
213. Stacey-Rae Simcox et al., Understanding TBI in our Nation’s Military and Veterans: Its
Occurrence, Identification and Treatment, and Legal Ramifications, 84 UMKC L. REV. 373, 380
(2015).
214. Hagel Memo, supra note 39, at 1.
215. Notes from Powers Presentation, supra note 204. Colonel Edward C. Segura of the AFDRB
said the same thing on the panel: “I have a bias as a former commander.” Notes from Presentation by
Edward C. Segura, President, AFDRB, Best Practices Before Military Review Boards, Veterans Legal
Assistance Conference of 2019 (June 7, 2019) (on file with author); see also Complaint ¶¶ 218–19,
Manker, supra note 168 (“Finally, Defendant’s high rate of denying PTSD-related discharge upgrade
applications—about 85 percent—indicates that the NDRB has a systemic institutional bias or secret
policy that discriminates against applicants who suffer from PTSD. This secret policy is unfair and
contrary to the Plaintiffs’ constitutional right to due process because it contradicts public guidance, such
as the Hagel Memo, and because it underlies a sham decisionmaking process whereby denial is virtually
preordained for applicants before the NDRB due to prejudice.”); Segura & Powers, supra note 203, at
4, 18 (emphasizing Air Force Discharge Review Board’s presumption that “military discharged its
duties correctly/lawfully/in good faith” and NDRB’s treatment of conflicting facts as “[d]iscovered
dishonesty [that] creates doubt concerning an Applicant’s submitted evidence”).
216. COUNCIL OF REVIEW BOARDS, Preparing for a Personal Appearance Hearing at
Washington
Navy
Yard,
DC,
SEC’Y
OF
THE
NAVY,
https://www.secnav.navy.mil/mra/CORB/Pages/NDRB/hphd.aspx [https://perma.cc/3U3W-H9HC].
217. SECNAVINST 5420.174D, supra note 70, ¶ 403(a) (directing that board members be
“career military officers”).
218. Weber, supra note 52, at 129.
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veteran’s criminal drug activity was exactly the type of behavior related to TBI,
even though the veteran asserted that the TBI caused or at least heavily
influenced his behavior.
Of course, liberal consideration does allow that “the severity of
misconduct” in some cases “may outweigh any mitigation from mental health
conditions.”219 Here, though, instead of weighing the severity of misconduct and
considering whether the mental health condition mitigated the behavior, the
Board merely rejected the veteran’s request by saying the “record did not show
that a Mental Health Diagnosis was a sufficient mitigating factor” without an
explanation for why and how the “record did not show.”220 While not explicit,
the why and how was likely the presumption of government regularity and the
veteran’s failure to overcome the presumption.221
Furthermore, in this assessment, the Board ignored the Kurta Memo’s
guidance that Honorable discharges do not require “flawless military service.”222
An Honorable discharge may be appropriate “despite some relatively minor or
infrequent misconduct.”223 Here, the behavior was certainly infrequent; in the
veteran’s fourteen years of service, this was an isolated event. And within the
construct of liberal consideration, a mental health condition can mitigate a drug
charge. If the Board determined that a felony charge later reduced to a
misdemeanor was not “relatively minor,” it should have stated so and then
considered whether the infrequency of the conduct—a single isolated event in a
fourteen-year period of service—justified an upgrade. That the Board rejected
this possibility in favor of the government further shows how the Board defers
to the deeply rooted presumption in favor of the commanders who made the
original decisions. The Board’s rejection also reflects the deeply rooted ideals of
good order and discipline, consistent with the Board’s unwillingness to accept
that less-than-flawless service is Honorable.
B. Refusal to Allow Mitigation of Willful Misconduct
In the context of liberal consideration, “willful misconduct” is used to mask
the Board’s lack of engagement with relaxed evidentiary standards and its
rejection of a relationship between mental health conditions and specific
instances of behavior. Liberal consideration responds to the connection between
mental health conditions and misconduct, giving veterans with mental health
219. Kurta Memo, supra note 39, attach. ¶ 18.
220. NDRB No. ND17-01353, supra note 205.
221. The paragraph that concluded with the determination that the mental health diagnosis was
insufficient began with a statement of the presumption of regularity, suggesting the decision was related
to the presumption. See id. In other decisions, the Board made the decision more explicit. See, e.g.,
NDRB No. ND17-01269 (on file with author) (“The Applicant attributes her drug abuse to MST brought
about after the alleged sexual assault. As mentioned above, the Board presumes regularity in the conduct
of governmental affairs unless there is substantial credible evidence to rebut the presumption. The
Applicant failed to provide credible evidence to substantiate her claim.”).
222. Kurta Memo, supra note 39, attach. ¶ 26(h).
223. Id.
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conditions reasonable opportunities for relief when past misconduct was due to
a mental health condition. Liberal consideration recognizes that misconduct may
be unrelated to a mental health condition, and the Kurta Memo cautions the
boards to balance severity with mitigation.224 The Board, however, often replaces
the required balancing with a blanket rejection of the need to balance by
categorizing the misconduct as “willful misconduct,” thereby justifying denial
of relief.225 As the Kurta Memo makes clear, the idea of willful misconduct is
problematic in the sphere of mental health conditions because what appears to
be willful misconduct can be a symptom of a mental health condition, for which
a veteran should not be punished.226 Yet the idea of willful misconduct remains
a default basis for rejecting a request for relief and affirming a commander’s
decision.227
For example, in a case where a veteran claimed that a mental health
condition mitigated his drug use, the Board used the lack of in-service or postservice mental health diagnosis to conclude that “the record reflects willful
misconduct that demonstrated he was unfit for further service.”228 This decision
completely ignored the Kurta Memo’s directives that a “veteran’s testimony
alone . . . may establish the existence of a condition,”229 that evidence of a mental
health condition includes “changes in behavior” and “substance abuse,”230 and
that misconduct itself “may be evidence of a mental health condition.”231 This
veteran had over four years of service and a Good Conduct Medal, among other
awards.232 Given that the veteran had documented good service, liberal
consideration suggests at least a possibility that his drug abuse was related to a
mental health condition. However, the Board did not consider this, in disregard
of the Kurta Memo’s directive to give liberal consideration to these factors when
there is no documented diagnosis beyond the veteran’s statement.233
Even when there is documentation of a mental health condition, the Board
typically fails to implement liberal consideration by focusing on the misconduct
rather than considering whether the mental health condition mitigated the
misconduct. In a case involving documentation of a sexual assault report, mental
health conditions, and a post-service PTSD diagnosis originating from an inservice MST, the NDRB—egregiously and in flagrant disregard for the Kurta
Memo’s guidance—denied the veteran’s request for an upgrade, citing to the
224. Id. attach. ¶ 18.
225. See, e.g., NDRB No. ND17-01269, supra note 221 (“Though the Applicant may feel that
MST and other mental health conditions may have been an underlying cause to her misconduct, the
record reflects willful misconduct that demonstrated she was unfit for further service.”).
226. Kurta Memo, supra note 39, attach. ¶ 6.
227. See, e.g., NDRB No. ND17-01269, supra note 221.
228. NDRB No. ND18-00184 (on file with author).
229. Kurta Memo, supra note 39, attach. ¶ 7.
230. Id. attach. ¶ 5.
231. Id. attach. ¶ 6.
232. NDRB No. ND18-00184, supra note 228.
233. Kurta Memo, supra note 39, attach. ¶¶ 7, 11.
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absence of “credible evidence to substantiate her claim.”234 The veteran
“attribute[d] her drug abuse to MST brought about after the alleged sexual
assault.”235 Rather than engaging in an assessment of whether the MST and other
mental health conditions excused or mitigated the discharge, the Board simply
ignored the evidence that would favor an upgrade and focused on other evidence
to reach a negative decision on the basis of willful misconduct.
In that case, the Board may have focused on the fact that the veteran
admitted to using drugs prior to enlistment—something she had not admitted to
at the time of enlistment—in order to conclude that her asserted mental health
conditions did not mitigate her misconduct.236 Although a former instance of
self-medication for food poisoning had nothing to do with the drug use that led
to her discharge, the Board used the veteran’s untimely drug use admission as a
basis for determining “she was unfit for further service.”237 The Board, though,
did not engage with an explanation for how or why that prior drug use
outweighed the veteran’s documented sexual assault and mental health
conditions. Instead, the Board just dismissed the evidence as the veteran’s
feelings:
The Applicant attributes her drug abuse to MST brought about after the
alleged sexual assault. . . . Though the Applicant may feel that MST and
other mental health conditions may have been an underlying cause to
her misconduct, the record reflects willful misconduct that demonstrated
she was unfit for further service. There is not sufficient evidence to
suggest that the Applicant’s claim of MST or other mental health
conditions mitigated the Applicant’s misconduct.238
The Board finally mentioned mitigation but did not engage in any sort of
balancing to determine or explain why the mental health condition did not
mitigate the drug use that occurred while she was on active duty.239
The Board’s focus on the previous instances of the veteran’s premeditated
drug use masked the actual question that liberal consideration required: whether
her documented in-service MST, sexual assault, and PTSD mitigated the drug
use that led to her discharge. By not considering the possibility that the veteran’s
conditions “affect[ed] [her] behaviors and choices,” the Board failed to
implement liberal consideration.240 Furthermore, the Board offered no reasoning
to explain why and how the “MST or other mental health conditions did not
mitigate the Applicant’s misconduct”; instead, the Board generically referred to
insufficient evidence.241 To the extent the Board determined that the severity of
the conduct outweighed any mitigation from mental health conditions, the Board
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.

NDRB No. ND17-01269, supra note 221.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
See id.
Kurta Memo, supra note 39, attach. ¶ 26(e).
NDRB No. ND17-01269, supra note 221.
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should have explained its conclusion to demonstrate its application of liberal
consideration.242 Instead, the Board relied on “willful misconduct” to avoid
implementing liberal consideration—or at least appearing to avoid it.243
C. Rejection of Relaxed Evidentiary Standards
Liberal consideration requires relaxed evidentiary standards in determining
whether the veteran has (or had) a mental health condition that may have
mitigated misconduct. Relaxed evidentiary standards are central to liberal
consideration. The Kurta Memo specifically instructs that the veteran’s
testimony—and that testimony alone—”may establish the existence of a
condition or experience.”244 The veteran’s testimony can also serve as evidence
that connects the condition or experience to the veteran’s military service and
that the condition “excuses or mitigates the discharge.”245 The Board fails to
apply these relaxed evidentiary standards to two bases upon which it denies
relief: (1) absence of a formal mental health diagnosis, and (2) insufficient nexus
between a mental health condition and behavior.
1. Absence of a Formal Mental Health Diagnosis
Despite the Kurta Memo’s guidance, the Board continues to reject
discharge upgrade requests on the basis that there is no diagnosis, either during
or post-service. The Kurta Memo explicitly instructs the boards what to do when
there is a lack of medical diagnosis for the veteran’s claimed condition or
experience: accept the veteran’s testimony as evidence of the condition or
experience.246 But the Board continues to treat the absence of a formal diagnosis
as a death knell for the upgrade request. In some of these cases, the Board not
only rejects a diagnosis based on the veteran’s statement alone, but also finds
that the veteran’s prior failure to reach out for support casts doubt on the
veteran’s testimony. This approach, in conflict with liberal consideration,
perpetuates the Board’s historic hostility to recognizing the role of mental health
conditions in servicemembers’ behavior.247 By rejecting veterans’ statements in
the absence of a diagnosis, the Board further entrenches the “Military
Misconduct Catch-22”: the Board requires evidence a veteran does not have

242. See, e.g., Kurta Memo, supra note 39, attach. ¶¶ 18–19.
243. NDRB No. ND17-01269, supra note 221.
244. Kurta Memo, supra note 39, attach. ¶ 7.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. In granting class certification, the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut
also noticed the NDRB’s failure to implement liberal consideration in the cases of the two named
plaintiffs. Manker v. Spencer, 329 F.R.D. 110, 120–21 (D. Conn. 2018) (“It is arguably unclear from
the NDRB’s explanation of their denials what standard is being used nor when PTSD would mitigate
misconduct . . . . [T]he NDRB’s decision appears to use a stricter standard that seems to disbelieve that
Manker could have suffered from PTSD without an official diagnosis and that his PTSD could have
influenced his ‘willful’ actions.”).
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access to, because the veteran’s discharge status makes the veteran ineligible for
VA health care.248
For example, in one case, a former marine explained that “his drug use was
caused by an in-service medical health condition,” i.e., general anxiety and
bipolar disorder.249 Under liberal consideration, the marine’s statement should
have been enough to establish the possibility that he suffered from a mental
health condition.250 Instead of liberally considering his testimony, the Board
required “evidence to undoubtedly indicat[e] he was diagnosed with anxiety or
bipolar disorder.”251 This requirement for undoubtable evidence goes beyond the
Board’s regular credibility determination and thwarts liberal consideration.252
The Kurta Memo also provides that the Board “should not condition relief
on the existence of evidence that would be unreasonable or unlikely under the
specific circumstances of the case.”253 In this case, liberal consideration would
have required the Board to at least consider whether it was reasonable or likely
that the marine’s record contained evidence of a mental health condition. Even
if this were not reasonable or likely, liberal consideration would have given the
marine the benefit of the doubt, especially because the Kurta Memo warns that
“[m]ental health conditions . . . are frequently unreported.”254 Instead, in denying
relief based on the lack of documentation, the Board’s decision shows no true
engagement with liberal consideration.
In part to remedy the past approach of stopping inquiry in the absence of a
documented diagnosis, liberal consideration requires the Board to assess other
evidence that could support the diagnosis. Here, the veteran’s misconduct was
drug abuse, and liberal consideration recognizes “substance abuse” as evidence
of a mental health condition.255 When faced with facts about substance abuse as
a result of a mental health condition, and when nothing suggests that the
requesting servicemember had a sustained drug use problem or that his drug use
was not related to a mental health condition, liberal consideration would have
instructed the Board to give favorable weight to evidence supporting the
existence of a mental health condition. Instead of liberally viewing the evidence
of substance abuse as evidence of a mental health condition, the Board cursorily

248. Seamone, supra note 86, at 503 (“[T]he Military Misconduct Catch-22 concerns a very
specific dilemma. Concisely stated by Attorney Carissa Picard: [‘]What’s the point of DoD recognizing
that PTSD/TBI causes misconduct when it doesn’t do anything to stop [the] “pattern of misconduct”
discharges for soldiers with PTSD/TBI? How can it say [that] this is evidence of a service-related
disability only to use this evidence to deny servicemembers access to benefits for that disability?[‘]”)
(alterations in original) (citations omitted)).
249. NDRB No. MD17-00856 (on file with author).
250. See Kurta Memo, supra note 39, attach. ¶ 7.
251. NDRB No. MD17-00856, supra note 249.
252. See 32 C.F.R. § 70.8(e)(6)(ii)(B)(2) (2018) (explaining the boards’ evaluation of evidence
as to whether it is “sufficiently credible”).
253. Kurta Memo, supra note 39, attach. ¶ 26(f).
254. Id. attach. ¶ 26(d).
255. Id. attach. ¶ 5.
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rejected the veteran’s statement.256 The Board claimed to have done “a thorough
review,” but did not discuss that review or indicate engagement with the Kurta
Memo’s guidance.257
The Board then went even further afield from liberal consideration by
finding that the marine’s failure to reach out to anyone or take advantage of the
various resources available to assist active duty servicemembers justified its
rejection of his mental health condition. The Board noted that “the Applicant did
not provide any evidence to indicate he attempted to use the numerous services
available for servicemembers who undergo personal or mental health problems
during their enlistment, such as the Navy Chaplain, Medical or Mental Health
professionals, Navy Relief Society, Family Advocacy Programs, or even the Red
Cross.”258 Under liberal consideration, the marine’s failure to seek assistance is
consistent with how “[m]ental health conditions . . . inherently affect one’s
behaviors and choices causing veterans to think and behave differently than
might otherwise be expected.”259 Essentially, even if the Board believed that a
servicemember suffering from a mental health condition should logically reach
out to available resources, liberal consideration acknowledges that these
conditions could cause different behaviors. At a minimum, liberal consideration
required the Board to grapple with the possibility that the lack of reaching out
was a legitimate behavior, rather than dismiss the discharge upgrade request
based on a lack of evidence that the servicemember sought assistance.
The Board has failed to implement liberal consideration in the absence of a
formal diagnosis on several other occasions. For instance, the Board flat out
ignored the Kurta Memo’s guidance when it concluded that “statements alone,
without sufficient documentary evidence” cannot support a favorable
decision.260 The Board noted the multiple sources where it did not find evidence
of a diagnosis: military records, post-service VA records, and the veteran’s
documentation submitted with the upgrade request.261 The Board also noted the
lack of evidence that the servicemember had sought out any mental health
assistance while in service.262 Instead of relying on the veteran’s statement as
evidence of a mental health condition, the Board declared itself “unable to
establish this contention as a basis for mitigation or consideration as an
extenuating circumstance,” citing the absence of a mental health diagnosis.263
But the veteran’s statement was evidence, and the Board should have at least
considered that statement, even if it did not ultimately find the evidence credible.

256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.

NDRB No. MD17-00856, supra note 249.
See id.
Id.
Kurta Memo, supra note 39, attach. ¶ 26(e).
See NDRB No. ND17-00793; Kurta Memo, supra note 39, attach. ¶ 7.
NDRB No. ND17-00793, supra note 260.
Id.
Id.
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2. Insufficient Nexus Between Mental Health Condition and Misconduct
The Kurta Memo directs boards to ask whether there is a nexus between a
mental health condition and misconduct.264 In evaluating the nexus, the boards
must consider challenges the veteran may have in “presenting a thorough appeal
for relief because of how the asserted condition or experience has impacted the
veteran’s life.”265 Rather than extend liberal consideration in cases where the
nexus is not clear, the Board has gone out of its way to deny relief based on
insufficient nexus.
For example, in case ND18-00046, the NDRB denied relief to a Navy
veteran with almost five years of active duty service who claimed that PTSD due
to an MST mitigated her periods of Unauthorized Absence (UA),266 because the
Board found no nexus between the mental health condition and UA.267 This case
is certainly the type of case in which, if properly applied, liberal consideration
would support an upgrade: a servicemember experiences a military sexual
trauma, had PTSD due to that trauma, and her PTSD symptoms included periods
of her avoiding her military responsibilities through UA.
The Board focused on nexus in this case and to some extent used the
veteran’s evidence against her rather than viewing it through the lens of liberal
consideration. In support of her request for an upgrade to Honorable, the veteran
provided her statement of MST, resultant PTSD, and related periods of UA.268
She also provided a record from the VA that showed she had a 70 percent
disability “tie[d] . . . to” the PTSD that resulted from her assault.269 The veteran’s
request for relief showed that the assault happened in 2004, relatively early in
her enlistment, prior to her separation in 2008.270 She had one period of UA in
2004 and two in 2008.271 The Board concluded that the veteran did not explain
how the 2004 MST mitigated the 2008 misconduct.272 Here, the Board was
wrong in focusing on an insufficient explanation in the veteran’s pro se
application. The Board should have liberally considered the possibility that the
veteran could still be dealing with PTSD four years after an MST and that it is
not unreasonable or inconsistent for someone with PTSD to show symptoms at
different times. The veteran may not have included a specific statement that tied
the 2004 MST and the 2008 UA together, but she did assert in her upgrade
request that “PTSD mitigate[d] her misconduct [because] her periods of UA were
her protecting herself from additional military assaults.”273 Even so, the Board
264. See Kurta Memo, supra note 39, attach. ¶ 2.
265. Id. attach. ¶ 26(g).
266. Known as AWOL in other branches.
267. NDRB
No.
ND18-00046,
https://boards.law.af.mil/NAVY/DRB/2018_Navy/ND1800046.rtf [https://perma.cc/MB47-ADWK].
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id.
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denied relief, citing the lack of “additional explanation explaining how the 2004
event can explain or mitigate the misconduct in 2008.”274
Liberal consideration would recognize that PTSD “inherently affect[s]
one’s behaviors and choices” in ways that cause a veteran “to think and behave
differently than might otherwise be expected.”275 In relying on an insufficient
nexus, the Board’s decision did not mention liberal consideration, nor did it
explain how it liberally considered the veteran’s evidence.276 After a mere fivesentence discussion of the issue, the Board focused on the gap in time as
determinative rather than liberally considering how earlier events could have
later behavioral effects:
Without an additional explanation explaining how the 2004 event can
explain or mitigate the misconduct in 2008, the NDRB found the
characterization of the Applicant’s discharge was equitable and
consistent with the characterization of discharge given others in similar
circumstances.277
The Board did not engage with the possibility that the gap in time may
simply be different from what the Board expected, rather than a sign that there
was no connection between the two events. Any number of triggers could have
arisen in 2008 that related to the veteran’s 2004 MST experience. Perhaps the
veteran was able to cope for several years after the trauma, but then broke down
under the stress. Here, had the Board used liberal consideration, the relaxed
evidentiary standards would have benefited the veteran by taking some of the
burden off of her.278 Liberal consideration would also take into account the
possibility that the veteran may have difficulty presenting a complete
explanation of the nexus, given the severity of the PTSD and how it has affected
the veteran.279 Rather than look to the unrepresented veteran to present a
complete and cohesive explanation of how her PTSD mitigated her behavior, the
Board should have eased the burden on the veteran by looking through the lens
of liberal consideration to provide some relief and honor this MST survivor’s
service.280
In another example, the Board invoked “liberal consideration” but refused
to accept a veteran’s explanation of the nexus between his PTSD and drug use.
In this case, the veteran had over eleven years of active duty with numerous
awards, including two Good Conduct Medals, three Meritorious Unit

274. Id.
275. Kurta Memo, supra note 145, attach. ¶ 26(e).
276. NDRB No. ND18-00046, supra note 267.
277. Id.
278. For example, liberal consideration mandates that the boards “should not condition relief on
the existence of evidence that would be unreasonable or unlikely under the specific circumstances of the
case.” See Kurta Memo, supra note 39, attach. ¶ 26(f).
279. See id. attach. ¶ 26(g) (explaining that veterans “may have difficulty presenting a thorough
appeal for relief because of how the asserted condition or experience has impacted the veteran’s life”).
280. See Kurta Memo, supra note 39, attach. ¶ 26(g); see also sources cited supra note 162.
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Commendations, and overseas deployments.281 The military discharged the
veteran for drug abuse, and he sought a discharge upgrade on the basis that his
PTSD mitigated the drug abuse.282 He explained that he used drugs “to stay
awake and protect his children” and “to self-medicate for the PTSD and anxiety
caused by the previous trauma.”283 Self-medication for PTSD is a known coping
mechanism, and finding a nexus between PTSD and drug use is reasonable, if
not the exact scenario liberal consideration grew out of.284
The Board mentioned liberal consideration, but cursorily applied it without
explanation. With a dearth of reasoning, the Board stated that “even when
viewing this case through the lens of liberal consideration, [it] did not find an
adequate nexus and/or mitigation to warrant an upgrade.”285 The veteran had a
solid and positive service record, serving “five out of the six years of the contract
honorably.”286 He had a diagnosed mental health issue, and the Kurta Memo
recognized drug abuse as a known coping mechanism for PTSD.287 The veteran
acknowledged his mistakes, and the Board noted what it viewed as
inconsistencies in the veteran’s reasons for using drugs: caring for his children
and self-medicating.288 Rather than at least recognizing the self-medication as a
symptom and even partially mitigating his status, the Board suggested that caring
for children could not justify drug use even if self-medication could.289 It is not
clear whether the Board would have upgraded the veteran’s status if he had not
mentioned caring for children, because the Board did not clarify whether both
bases for drug use were inadequate to establish a nexus.290
A. Resistance to Providing Full Relief
Liberal consideration is a veteran-friendly policy shift, designed to give
veterans a “reasonable opportunity for relief.”291 Liberal consideration
encourages relief but does not require full relief in the form of upgrades to
Honorable. Still, the premise of liberal consideration suggests that real and full
281. NDRB
No.
ND18-00333,
https://boards.law.af.mil/NAVY/DRB/2018_Navy/ND1800333.rtf [https://perma.cc/8E2K-T3LH].
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. For example, in the Vietnam veteran class action lawsuit that directly led to the Hagel
Memo, Class Representative Conley Monk “self-medicated with drugs” after experiencing multiple
combat and racial stressors while stationed in Vietnam. Complaint, Monk v. Mabus, supra note 84, ¶ 33.
He experienced flashbacks and “took drugs to cope with the symptoms of his then-undiagnosed PTSD.”
Id. The Complaint further explained that Monk was diagnosed “with PTSD that is attributable to his
service.” Id. ¶ 39. It continued: “Mr. Monk’s misconduct that led to his other than honorable discharge
is also attributable to the PTSD he developed during the course of his military service.” Id. ¶ 39.
285. NDRB No. ND18-00333, supra note 281.
286. Id.
287. See id.; Kurta Memo, supra note 39, attach. ¶ 5.
288. See NDRB No. ND18-00333, supra note 281.
289. See id.
290. See id.
291. Kurta Memo, supra note 39.
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relief comes only from an upgrade to Honorable.292 The Board, however, often
skirts full relief by finding in favor of granting relief based on liberal
consideration, but then denying full relief on other grounds.293 It is reasonable
that there could be some cases where partial relief (or no relief) is appropriate
even within the liberal consideration scheme. For example, when a pattern of
misconduct is so egregious as to suggest some level of willfulness or when the
connection between a mental health condition and particular behavior is too
tenuous. Partial relief may be better than denial, but an upgrade to less-thanHonorable does not reflect the purpose or principles of liberal consideration,
especially when that partial relief is granted seemingly in disregard of liberal
consideration.
For example, in a case where the Board viewed “the case with liberal
consideration that the Applicant’s well-documented mental health situation
mitigated the misconduct, the NDRB found the characterization of the
Applicant’s discharge was inequitable and not consistent with the
characterization of discharge given others in similar circumstances” for
“disrespect.”294 If the decision ended there, the veteran would presumably have
received an upgrade. Instead, the Board went on to discuss how the veteran’s
commitment to a civilian treatment facility—for treatment of the documented
mental health condition—was a serious offense of UA.295
In this confusing and contradictory decision, the Board recognized the welldocumented mental health condition and the nexus between the mental health
condition and the “disrespect” that led to his discharge. However, the Board
ignored the nexus between getting treatment for his mental health condition and
his time away from the Navy.296 Here, the Board did not explain how or why the
mental health condition did not mitigate the resultant time away in the civilian
292. See id. attach. ¶¶ 24, 26(h) (implying the primacy of upgrades to Honorable).
293. See,
e.g.,
NDRB
No.
ND18-00013,
https://boards.law.af.mil/NAVY/DRB/2018_Navy/ND1800013.rtf [https://perma.cc/8HJ7-L5FM].
294. Id.
295. See id. The Board’s decision also discussed how the veteran “waived [his] right” to present
his case to an administrative board before discharge and that—because he waived his right—he accepted
his other-than-honorable discharge. Id. This waiver analysis is problematic in general given the military
power dynamic between a commander and an enlisted servicemember. In the context of liberal
consideration’s recognition that those original discharge decisions may have been wrong, a waiver
cannot legitimately stand in for acceptance of an erroneous decision. For many servicemembers
separating under stressful conditions, including other-than-honorable discharge, signing the waiver is
just one more task in a stack of paperwork to complete before being released from the military, and that
signature may not represent a valid waiver of rights or acceptance of discharge characterization. With
PTSD due to combat, MST, or other stressors, the validity of a waiver is at least questionable. “Deeply
traumatized and often very young service members may not be in any condition to make such an
important decision in the aftermath of a sexual assault.” HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 28, at 8.
Servicemembers experiencing trauma may “not fully comprehend the characterization of the separation
and would ‘take anything just to get out.’” Id. (quoting phone interview with a veteran). Other
servicemembers, even if not experiencing trauma, may just not want to question their commander, and
“[a]ll too often they fail to appreciate the consequences of a bad discharge or mistakenly believe that it
will be easy to upgrade later.” Id.
296. See NDRB No. ND18-00013, supra note 293.
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treatment facility in the same way that it mitigated the disrespect.297 This veteran
had a strong record of service, with Honorable service for seven years prior to
the enlistment he was on at the time of discharge.298 During those seven years,
he earned two Good Conduct Medals, a Navy Achievement Medal, and other
awards and promotions.299 His period of UA while in a civilian treatment
facility—where he was receiving medical care for a mental health condition—
seems like just the sort of circumstance liberal consideration intended to view
favorably as mitigating the UA, and not as premeditated misconduct.300 In fact,
a UA for receiving mental health treatment seems even more legitimate as a basis
for relief than many other types of mental health-associated misconduct, because
the reason for the “misconduct” was getting treatment for a mental health
condition.
For another example, this Article returns to Navy Veteran Michelle Essex’s
story in the Introduction to demonstrate how the Board avoids full relief.
Michelle requested an upgrade from “Under Other Than Honorable Conditions”
to “Honorable” based on MST and related PTSD, which she argued mitigated
her drug abuse.301 The Board acknowledged her documented PTSD and the
nexus to her behavior, stating that “the NDRB determined [her] diagnosed PTSD
and MST was a mitigating factor associated with her in-service misconduct.”302
Prior to her active duty enlistment, Michelle had six years of reserve duty and
received multiple awards including three Navy and Marine Corps Achievement
Medals and the Naval Reserve Meritorious Service Medal.303 She served a
combat tour in support of Operation Enduring Freedom, and her exemplary
service was well documented in her performance record.304
On these facts, liberal consideration required a balancing of the MST and
PTSD against the misconduct, drug abuse (a recognized coping mechanism for
PTSD). But the Board did not engage in that balancing; instead, the Board found
that Michelle’s “service was honest and faithful but significant negative aspects
of [her] conduct outweighed the positive aspects of [her] service which
warrant[ed] changing [her] discharge” to only General (Under Honorable
Conditions) rather than to Honorable.305 The Board’s balancing was about
positive and negative service aspects, not about how MST and PTSD could have
mitigated her drug abuse. Thus, the Board misdirected its decision, veering away
from the lens of liberal consideration.

297. See id.
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. See Kurta Memo, supra note 39 (ensuring “fair and consistent standards of review for
veterans with mental health conditions”).
301. NDRB No. ND17-01559, supra note 1.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Id.
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The Board also recognized that “PTSD and MST [were] a mitigating
factor.”306 As a basis for the partial relief of a General (Under Honorable
Conditions) upgrade, the Board stated that “the NDRB does not consider PTSD
as a reason to completely absolve the Applicant of her misconduct.”307 This
statement stood on its own with no engagement with how it may be inconsistent
with liberal consideration.308 Liberal consideration indicates that the severity of
the misconduct will only outweigh the mental health condition in “some cases,”
309
but the Board did not explain how this particular case falls into that limited
scope of cases.310 Instead, the Board seemed to use a predetermination that PTSD
could not absolve misconduct, in disregard of the Kurta Memo’s guidance
relevant to the facts here that “substance-seeking behavior and efforts to selfmedicate symptoms of a mental health condition may warrant consideration.”311
The Kurta Memo further instructs that the “relative severity of some misconduct
can change over time, thereby changing the relative weight of the
misconduct,”312 yet the Board ignores this with the blanket boilerplate statement:
“Violation of Article 112a though isolated, warrant[s] separation from the Naval
Service to maintain proper order and discipline.”313 The Board’s recognition of
the violation as isolated renders its determination not to upgrade to Honorable
even more egregious. This is because liberal consideration is founded on the idea
that relief is appropriate when a servicemember’s infrequent or isolated
misconduct resulted from a mental health condition.314
Michelle should have benefited from liberal consideration and received a
full upgrade to Honorable under the Kurta Memo. As the Kurta Memo directs,
“Honorable discharge characterization does not require flawless service” but
rather includes even “some relatively minor or infrequent misconduct.”315
Because of the Board’s illiberal consideration, the Board granted partial relief to
change her service characterization to “General (Under Honorable Conditions).”
But, the Board did nothing to change the narrative reason for her discharge, and
so she continues to carry “Misconduct (Drug Abuse)” on her DD-214 even
though the Board determined some relief was appropriate.316
The Board has also managed to deny relief by outright ignoring liberal
consideration. For example, in the case of a servicemember discharged as a result
of an agreement to separate from service rather than face court-martial for drug
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. Kurta Memo, supra note 39, attach. ¶ 18.
310. See NDRB No. ND17-01559, supra note 1.
311. Kurta Memo, supra note 39, attach. ¶ 19.
312. Id. attach. ¶ 26(i).
313. NDRB No. ND17-01559, supra note 1 (referring to 10 U.S.C. § 912a, which concerns
“[w]rongful use, possession, etc., of controlled substances”).
314. Kurta Memo, supra note 39, attach. ¶ 26(h).
315. Id. attach. ¶ 26(h).
316. NDRB No. ND17-01559, supra note 1.
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charges, the Board focused on “using, transporting, and possessing narcotics” as
an offense warranting separation, without putting the offense in the context of
liberal consideration.317 The servicemember had documented PTSD, and the
Board noted that the records “support[ed] the Applicant’s contention that his
PTSD could have been a mitigating factor associated with the in-service
misconduct.”318 The Board also noted “the Applicant’s heroic and meritorious
service in combat.”319 With clear answers to the first three Kurta Memo questions
(documented diagnosis, in-service, and nexus), liberal consideration requires
balancing.320 However, there was no balancing in the decision. Instead, the Board
left open the question of how to balance PTSD with the misconduct, and
concluded by denying relief.
In these partial and no-relief cases involving mental health conditions and
misconduct, the Board almost seemed to mock servicemembers by
acknowledging their mental health condition, the connection between the
condition and misconduct, and the potential for the condition to mitigate the
misconduct. It is not clear what motivated the Board to deny relief in cases that
appeared to warrant relief under liberal consideration. Still, these themes may
suggest a bias in favor of the original commander’s decisions and a resistance to
recognizing Honorable as other than flawless.321 Thus, any solution requires
grappling with these underlying limitations.
V.
STOP KICKING AND START LIBERALLY CONSIDERING: MECHANISMS FOR
ENSURING LIBERAL APPLICATION OF LIBERAL CONSIDERATION AT THE NDRB
The themes described in Part IV represent shortcomings in both the liberal
consideration policy itself—in terms of insufficient implementation guidance—
and in the Board’s implementation of liberal consideration, and many of the
themes (and decisions) reflect a mix of shortcomings. On a general level, liberal
consideration’s failure at the NDRB seems to stem from two interrelated reasons.
First, the Kurta Memo did not explain how liberal consideration changes deeply
entrenched ideas about what Honorable means. Second, the Kurta Memo did not
change existing guidance or procedures, including traditional presumptions
under which the NDRB operates, or the inherent and acknowledged bias board
317. NDRB No. ND17-01210 (on file with author).
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. Kurta Memo, supra note 39, attach. ¶¶ 2(d), 18–19.
321. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Esper, No. 3:16-cv-02010-WWE, 2018 WL 6727353, at *5 (D. Conn.
Dec. 21, 2018) (noting the alleged “systematic failure of the ADRB to give proper consideration to the
directive of the Hagel Memo relevant to discharge upgrade applications”); Manker v. Spencer, No. 3:18cv-00372-CSH, 2019 WL 5846828, at *11 (D. Conn. Nov. 7, 2019) (discussing the plaintiffs’ contention
that the “NDRB has systematically denied veterans a fair discharge review process”); Complaint at 3,
37, Manker, supra note 168 (noting the NDRB’s denial of “almost 90 percent of applications alleging
PTSD or PTSD-related conditions” and describing the NDRB’s low grant rate as indicating “systemic
institutional bias or secret policy”); see also supra note 215 and accompanying text.
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members have in favor of commanders’ original discharge decisions. In other
words, liberal consideration created a means to relief but did not provide the
infrastructure to grant relief. And the Board has not taken it upon itself to create
that infrastructure, but instead continues to rely on past approaches.
At least to some extent, it seems that the Board’s “reasons” for denying
relief are just ways to mask the tension between what Honorable has historically
meant and what Honorable can mean in the liberal consideration context. This is
especially true in light of how the Board often describes an Honorable discharge
as a limited characterization due to only those who deserve it:
The NDRB recognizes that serving in the all-volunteer Armed Forces is
challenging but reflects a commitment to our Nation; thus, service
members deserve to be recognized upon completion of their service.
One of the ways in which our service members are recognized is through
the determination of their characterization of service. Most
servicemembers, however, serve honorably and therefore earn their
Honorable discharges. In fairness to those Marines and Sailors who
served honorably, Commanders and Separation Authorities are tasked
to ensure that undeserving servicemembers receive no higher
characterization than is due.322
In this statement, the Board implicitly rejects an expansive interpretation of
Honorable, even though that is exactly what liberal consideration contemplates
as a result of no longer punishing servicemembers for having mental health
conditions that mitigate misconduct.323 Though the NDRB does not explicitly
define Honorable as limited, this oft-repeated blanket statement about declining
to upgrade a discharge to preserve the honor and fairness to others with an
Honorable discharge suggests that the Board’s standard is “flawless.” This
standard persists even though neither DoD’s guidance nor the Navy’s guidance
requires flawless service to justify an Honorable characterization. Furthermore,
the Board’s statement about “undeserving servicemembers” suggests that
upgrading other-than-honorable discharges would somehow taint original
Honorable discharges.324 These limitations of liberal consideration under the
Kurta Memo serve as a starting point for strengthening implementation.325
A. Redefining Honorable in a Liberal Consideration World
Liberal consideration requires tolerance, open-mindedness, and
receptiveness to change. The NDRB must suspend its disbelief that mental health
conditions can mitigate bad behavior to the extent that an Honorable discharge
322. NDRB No. ND18-0047, supra note 211.
323. See sources cited supra note 162.
324. Without advancing any supporting evidence, the Board often relies on this assumption—
that upgrading would have an effect of undermining others’ Honorable service.
325. There are probably solutions at the Separation Authority level, as well, that would prevent
the military from discharging servicemembers with an other-than-honorable discharge in the mental
health-misconduct scenarios, but that is not the focus here.
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is justified. The Board has to get away from its traditional approach: refusing to
upgrade and confirming the punishment (or discipline) that the Separation
Authority issued. Under liberal consideration, the Board needs to end the practice
of providing only partial relief in the form of General discharges. The Board’s
denial of many discharge upgrade requests under ostensibly liberal consideration
is a failure to implement policy; the denial also perpetuates injustice for those
who have served.
To that end, “Honorable” in the context of Honorable discharge requires an
update. Honorable should be reimagined in the context of all that is known about
mental health conditions and behavior, as experienced by servicemembers.
Rather than punishing servicemembers for how their bodies and minds reacted
to what they experienced while in service, discharge characterizations should
consider service fulfilled despite health challenges and should avoid a
requirement of flawless service. Honorable characterizations in cases where
misconduct is linked to mental health conditions also reflect the nature of the
unwritten contract between the service and the servicemember: to leave no man
or woman behind.326 To truly leave no man or woman behind, to erase the
historic hostility and bias against what is viewed as weakness when it is in fact a
mental health condition, and to remove the punitive nature of other-thanhonorable discharges, “Honorable” must be viewed expansively through the lens
of liberal consideration. Redefining Honorable does not mean lessening the value
or honor to those who already have an Honorable discharge, but instead more
fairly recognizes a range of service and more accurately reflects a changing
military and society.
With authority over each service branch, DoD should ultimately mandate
any redefinition of “Honorable,” with each branch implementing the change in
its own service-specific documents. As a reminder, DoD defines Honorable as
“service [that] generally has met the standards of acceptable conduct and
performance of duty for military personnel, or is otherwise so meritorious that
any other characterization would be clearly inappropriate.”327 The services each
define Honorable similarly.328
326. See, e.g., Charles Bausman, Leave No Man Behind- Implications, Criticisms, and
Rationale, MOUNTAIN TACTICAL INST. (Sept. 2, 2016), https://mtntactical.com/knowledge/leave-noman-behind-implications-criticisms-rationale/ [https://perma.cc/BU4T-ZG7G] (“‘Leave No Man
Behind’ is a creed and ethos often repeated and adhered to by various units and soldiers.”); Sean D.
Naylor & Christopher Drew, SEAL Team 6 and a Man Left for Dead: A Grainy Picture of Valor, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 27, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/28/world/asia/seal-team-6-afghanistanman-left-for-dead.html [https://perma.cc/A6MA-EXFE] (“Like some other military units, Team 6
accepts as an article of faith that its members never leave a fallen comrade behind. While that can be
difficult to fulfill, it is a creed as old as warfare itself, a pact with those facing great peril. Abandoning a
wounded man to fight and die by himself, however inadvertent, officers say, would be devastating.”).
327. DoDI 1332.14, supra note 43, enclosure 4, para. 3(b)(2)(a).
328. See, e.g., AR 135-178, supra note 47, para. 2-9(a) (defining Honorable as “appropriate
when the quality of the Soldier’s service generally has met the standards of acceptable conduct and
performance of duty for Army personnel, or is otherwise so meritorious that any other characterization
would be clearly inappropriate”); MILPERSMAN 1910-304, supra note 48, para. 1, at 1 (defining
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A redefinition project should involve various stakeholders working
collaboratively toward a new definition, and should not rely solely on high-level
DoD officials at the development stage.329 These stakeholders include activeduty servicemembers and veterans; officers and enlisted personnel; mental
health care providers; representatives from Veteran Service Organizations;330
veterans’ advocates; veterans law clinic directors; and law professors. The
stakeholders should craft an explicit statement supporting the idea that
Honorable includes service by someone who experienced a traumatic event,
PTSD, or another mental health condition, and acted consistently with symptoms
of that condition, even when those actions would otherwise be defined as
misconduct by the UCMJ.
There are three considerations in redefining Honorable to account for
liberal consideration, the evolving nature of military service, and a changing
society. First, a reimagined definition of Honorable should be more inclusive,
explicitly rejecting a requirement of flawless service and explaining the
standards of acceptable conduct and performance within a range that includes
behavior consistent with a mental health condition. The new definition should
grapple with the concept of good order and discipline and what that means in the
context of mental health conditions that today’s military servicemembers
experience. Rather than focusing on good order and discipline from the exclusive
perspective of commanders charged with “tight control over their forces,”331 a
new definition should account for a broader understanding of military service.
Second, the definition should include language about mental health
conditions and how they can mitigate behavior that may otherwise be categorized
as misconduct. For example, the definition could say something like: “In the
recognition that military service can include stressors that cause PTSD or other
mental health conditions, servicemembers should not be punished for behavior
related to these conditions and instead should be recognized for their service in
spite of these challenges.” Alternatively, the definition could provide:
“Honorable service includes behavior that may be categorized as misconduct
under the UCMJ but is actually behavior consistent with a mental health
condition due to military service.” A redefinition should clarify that the

Honorable as “[when] the quality of the member’s service generally met the standard of acceptable
conduct and performance for naval personnel, or is otherwise so meritorious that any other
characterization of service would be clearly inappropriate”).
329. Such a collaboration has also been proposed by Human Rights Watch in regard to
developing a “working group with representatives from each service’s Board, civilian lawyers, and
veterans’ organizations to study standards for granting relief, determine best practices and procedures,
and make recommendations for uniform standards and procedures to be included in revised Defense
Department instructions.” HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 28, at 118.
330. OFFICE OF THE SEC’Y, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, VETERANS AND MILITARY
SERVICE ORGANIZATIONS, https://www.va.gov/vso/VSO-Directory.pdf [https://perma.cc/6GQ56CK3].
331. Weber, supra note 52, at 160.
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connection between behavior and mental health recognizes the servicemember’s
honor and commitment to service while facing mental health challenges.
In the context of mental health conditions, there could also be a bifurcated
definition of Honorable: one for a commander’s original discharge decision, and
one for an upgrade decision. This could be particularly effective when a
servicemember is discharged for misconduct without a mental health condition
diagnosis, but later presents a post-service diagnosis to a discharge review board.
For example, an Honorable definition for discharge upgrades could include
language such as: “Honorable service includes service by a servicemember
originally discharged for misconduct when it is later determined that an inservice mental health condition mitigates that misconduct under liberal
consideration.”
Third, the definition or guidance accompanying the definition should
explain that the discharge characterizations should reflect military and societal
changes. The definition should make room for the “significant modifications” to
warfare, “the pool of people from which the military draws,” and “society’s
expectations on how military members will be treated.”332 For example, the
definition could add language to account for the specific context of the
servicemember’s service. Instead of defining Honorable as justified when “the
quality of the member’s service generally met the standard of acceptable conduct
and performance for naval personnel,”333 the definition could broaden the
definition to recognize quality as holistic and the standard as modified by
particular duty assignments. An example of this change could be: “[based on a
holistic assessment,] the quality of the member’s service generally met the
standard of acceptable conduct and performance for naval personnel [in the
particular duty assignment(s)].”
The definition should also outline how the historical severity of some
misconduct can change over time to become less severe, as a way to force the
boards to see the changing landscape, so the boards are not blinded by traditional
views on behavior. For example, the Kurta Memo recognizes that “marijuana
use is still unlawful in the military but it is now legal in some states and it may
be viewed, in the context of mitigating evidence, as less severe today than it was
decades ago.”334 The military is an organization of tradition; it changes very
slowly and often with heavy resistance, but a definition that acknowledges
changing views can force commanders and discharge review boards to grapple
with outdated assumptions that no longer warrant an other-than-honorable
discharge.
If defining Honorable with all these considerations proves too complex,
DoD could provide a general definition and then go into details in subsections.
332. Id. at 161; see also id. at 176–77 (proposing a “workable definition of good order and
discipline”).
333. MILPERSMAN 1910-304, supra note 48, para. 1, at 1.
334. Kurta Memo, supra note 39, attach. ¶ 26(i). Note that changes to the UCMJ would be an
additional forward-looking step, but that is beyond the scope of this Article.
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DoD could add language to the definition to remind the boards that a discharge
decision must be made on an individual basis. For example, the phrase
“acceptable conduct and performance of duty for military personnel,”335 could
be modified to include “under the circumstances,” to acknowledge the variety of
situations military personnel experience and to require the boards to fully
consider the particular circumstances of each case.
To the extent that structuring a definition may prove challenging given the
various stakeholders’ interests, the stakeholders should not let the challenge stop
them from working toward a compromise, even if that compromise yields a
complicated result. There is plenty of existing complexity and specificity in
many DoD and military policies and procedures. Furthermore, none of the
proposed changes would mean that suddenly everyone receives an Honorable
discharge. The military may also need to slightly alter the remaining discharge
characterizations, but these characterizations would not be substantively affected
by expanding the meaning of Honorable. Moreover, misconduct unrelated to a
mental health condition would not necessarily warrant an Honorable discharge
under a new definition, though there may be room for a relaxed view of some
behavior in line with societal changes. For example, as described above, an
isolated instance of recreational marijuana use that is not connected to a mental
health condition might still warrant an upgrade given changing societal norms.
The stakeholders should work towards a compromise, even if doing so seems
challenging.
A broader definition of Honorable would not, as the Board suggests, be
unfair to other servicemembers because broadening the definition would not
change the quality of service.336 Unfairness would result from designating
Honorable to someone who did not meet the definition; for example, someone
with multiple violations of the UCMJ and no mental health condition to mitigate
the violations, someone with a mild mental health condition that could not be
connected to subsequent misconduct, or someone with a mental health condition
and misconduct that was connected to something else (e.g., stealing to pay off a
gambling debt or defacing property as artistic expression).
Accordingly, an expanded definition merely accounts for the evolving
understandings of mental health and behavior in a liberal consideration world.
Acknowledging that some behavior historically labeled as “misconduct” is
actually coping behavior connected to a mental health condition, and recognizing
that service under those conditions is as honorable as service completed without
a mental health condition and resulting misconduct, only serve to raise the
overall profile of military service in modern times. The fact that the number of
Honorable discharges could and should increase under an expanded definition
does not diminish other veterans’ Honorable service. Rather than continuing to
dismiss veterans with mental health conditions and records of misconduct as
335.
336.

DoDI 1332.14, supra note 43, enclosure 4, para. 3(b)(2)(a).
See, e.g., NDRB No. ND18-00471, supra note 211.
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“undeserving,” a reimagined definition would reflect a better, fairer, and more
just understanding of the various parameters of Honorable service.
With a more expansive definition that incorporates the underpinnings of
liberal consideration, the NDRB would have a better infrastructure within which
to make decisions.337 Of course, given its track record, there may be little reason
to think the Board would fully comply with a more expansive definition just
because it was supposed to.338 For this reason, additional, more specific changes
are required, as discussed in the following Section.
B. Revising Presumptions, Policies, and Procedures to Resolve
Inconsistencies Between Liberal Consideration and Service-specific
Procedural Guidance
In addition to reimagining the meaning of Honorable, there are numerous
presumptions, policies, and procedures that also require revision for consistency
with liberal consideration and a more expansive meaning of Honorable. Given
the number of presumptions, policies, and procedures involved in the boards’
decision-making, including some that may be unstated,339 this Article offers
some initial suggestions.340
1. Eliminate the Presumption of Government Regularity in Cases
Involving Mental Health Conditions
One of the most powerful bases to deny discharge upgrade requests is the
presumption of government regularity.341 The boards treat this regulatory
presumption as a blanket justification for denying relief.342 In other words, when
the boards invoke the presumption, all other considerations seem to fall away.
That approach, however, is inconsistent with liberal consideration that, in
essence, undermines the nature of a presumption of government regularity.
Given the inherent and acknowledged bias board members have in favor of the
337. A more expansive or current definition could also lead to fewer other-than-honorable
discharges at the time of discharge, and that change would also be a win for servicemembers with mental
health conditions, but my focus here is about relief at the discharge review board for the thousands of
veterans already discharged.
338. See supra Part IV (discussing the Board’s failure to implement liberal consideration).
339. See, e.g., Complaint, Manker, supra note 168. The prayer for relief includes injunctive relief
to require the NDRB to “establish[] constitutionally and statutorily compliant adjudication procedures,
including, but not limited to, publication of secret policies, improved training of agency personnel, and
clarified evidentiary standards,” and also “to ensure that the [NDRB] meaningfully and consistently
applies its own procedural standards in considering the effects of class members’ PTSD when
determining whether to upgrade their discharge statuses.” Id. at 41.
340. Of course, DoD policy change alone has been inadequate, but service-level policy change
consistent with a redefined, more expansive and inclusive understanding of Honorable would at least
create the opportunity to push the boards in the right direction.
341. 32 C.F.R. § 724.211 (2018) (“There is a presumption of regularity in the conduct of
governmental affairs. This presumption can be applied in any review unless there is substantial credible
evidence to rebut the presumption.”).
342. See supra Part IV.A.
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commanders who made the original decisions,343 this presumption of
government regularity creates too high a burden for veterans seeking upgrade
related to a mental health condition.
The underlying point of liberal consideration is that commanders were
unfairly discharging servicemembers with other-than-honorable discharges. The
unfair discharges focused on the misconduct while ignoring the existence of
PTSD and other mental health conditions that could explain the misconduct as
behavior consistent with the mental health condition rather than as willful
misconduct. When the NDRB relies on the presumption of regularity to deny
relief in the liberal consideration world, it is reaffirming what may have been
unfair in its regularity. In other words, “regular” does not mean “right” in the
context of how the military has responded to mental health conditions and
misconduct in the past. Presuming government regularity as a mechanism for
denying a discharge upgrade request is inconsistent with liberal consideration’s
recognition that past decisions may have been wrong, or at least inequitable.
Therefore, the NDRB must at least recognize this contradiction, stop relying on
the presumption as a strong justification for denying relief, and more fully
engage in the review of discharge decisions through the lens of liberal
consideration. Without letting go of the presumption, the Board cannot truly and
fully apply liberal consideration.
To eliminate the presumption of government regularity in cases involving
mental health conditions, DoD could issue clarifying guidance. A potential
guidance statement could read: “In cases involving mental health conditions
diagnosed in-service, there is no presumption of government regularity in the
discharge decision.” For those cases involving no in-service diagnosis, but with
a post-service diagnosis, the guidance could be something like this:
In cases involving mental health conditions unknown to the separation
authority at the time of discharge but later diagnosed, the presumption
of government regularity does not override the principles of liberal
consideration. Even though an original discharge decision may have
been regular, liberal consideration recognizes the potential inequity
given the post-service diagnosis. Thus, no decision may rest solely on
the presumption of government regularity and that presumption will not
automatically outweigh any potential mitigation due to a mental health
condition.
Ideally, new guidance would force the boards to grapple with the presumption
of regularity and how it does not work in the context of mental health conditions
and misconduct—or at least recognize how it does not work exactly the same
way as it did before liberal consideration. This change would also make it harder
for board members to act on their bias in favor of the commanders. Without the
presumption to rely on as a complement to bias against the veteran, the boards

343.

See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
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would necessarily have to more fully consider each discharge upgrade request
related to a mental health condition.
To take this proposal to eliminate the presumption of government regularity
even further, the Board can interpret liberal consideration as creating a veteranfavorable presumption and rejecting the traditional government-favorable
presumption of government regularity. This is consistent with the Kurta Memo’s
guidance to recognize veterans as “victim[s] of injustice” rather than as
wrongdoers.344 Within such a presumption, instead of applying government
regularity to deny relief as usual, the Board would presume that the government’s
regularity was actually problematic in assigning a less-than-honorable discharge
in the first place. That presumption may not be enough to grant relief, but it
would tip the balance toward finding in favor of the veteran rather than simply
affirming a commander’s decision.
2. Limit Discretion in Some Cases for Presumptive Relief Under Liberal
Consideration
To improve compliance with liberal consideration (as well as combat the
admitted bias the NDRB has against the “unsophisticated” veterans and in favor
of their peer-commanders), DoD could limit the boards’ discretion. To that end,
DoD could mandate upgrades under certain conditions such as mental health or
PTSD. Other advocates have called for similar presumptions.345 For example,
liberal consideration could require an upgrade to Honorable when the following
elements are satisfied:
1. veteran has a documented mental health diagnosis;
2. veteran’s misconduct was of a certain type (e.g., drug use or
UA for a limited number of days); and
3. there is evidence supporting the connection between the mental
health condition and the misconduct, such as general research
showing the type of behavior likely related to the mental health
condition.346
344. Kurta Memo, supra note 39, attach. ¶ 26(j).
345. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 28, at 122 (recommending that Congress
“[c]odify a presumption for veterans with documented PTSD that the PTSD contributed materially to
discharge classification”); SIDIBE & UNGER, supra note 26, at 9 (“Legislation should codify a
presumption of record correction for veterans with documented PTSD so that boards continue to
improve their handling of PTSD-related discharge upgrade applications.”); see also supra Part V.B.3.
346. DoD could consider creating specific metrics mandating an upgrade in some cases and
allowing discretion in others. For example, a documented PTSD diagnosis, two instances of drug use, a
nexus between the PTSD and drug use, and no other misconduct could be a scenario requiring an
automatic upgrade. On the other hand, a documented PTSD diagnosis, five instances of drug use, a
nexus between the PTSD and the drug use, and no other misconduct could require the Board’s discretion
in applying liberal consideration due to the number of instances of drug use. Any changes to establish
presumptive relief would also require updating service-specific instructions as illustrated by the
examples in this part. For example, if drug use is recognized as a mitigated behavior in mental health
condition cases, instructions requiring mandatory processing for administrative separation for drug
use—regardless of grade, performance, or time in service—would have to be revised. The Kurta Memo
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This presumptive approach eliminates the balancing that the Kurta Memo
requires,347 to minimize the boards’ discretion. DoD could decide which
categories of minor misconduct are presumptively mitigated by mental health
conditions and require the boards to upgrade in those scenarios. This approach
would also prevent the boards from falling back on government regularity or
other presumptions to avoid granting relief, and help prevent bias against the
veteran.
3. Revise Navy Instructions for Consistency with Liberal
Consideration
All services have their own instructions governing separation procedures in
addition to the general DoD guidance. The examples here focus on Navy
instructions but are applicable to all the branches. Given the specificity of Navy
instructions governing discharges and discharge upgrades, change is needed to
comply with liberal consideration as it exists and further develops. For example,
the Navy has not updated its instruction for NDRB procedures and standards
since December 22, 2004, well before liberal consideration was implemented.348
This gap may offer some explanation for the NDRB’s failure to implement the
Kurta Memo guidance because the Board may view compliance with the Navyspecific instruction as more precedential than the general DoD guidance. To
eliminate any conflict, the Navy instruction should be revised for consistency
with liberal consideration. To the extent that there is a new definition of
Honorable, the Board still needs revisions such as those proposed here to comply
with that new definition.
In other words, to the extent that there is some overlap between the proposal
to redefine Honorable and the suggestion to revise Navy instructions, this is
intentional. For example, the conflict between liberal consideration and the
presumption of government regularity as it currently exists should be resolved in
Navy policy. Navy policy recognizes the presumption of government affairs
generally and also within the context of how to review evidence and testimony.
In both instances, revision is needed for consistency with liberal consideration.
The following examples show the existing language of the instruction in regular
text followed by the proposed language for resolving the conflict in italicized
text.
Example 1:
Existing Text of Instruction:
211. Regularity of Government Affairs
explains that drug use may be viewed as consistent with mental health conditions and opens the door to
a less strict view on drug use. However, without a corresponding change in Navy policy, the NDRB
may uphold a discharge under Navy policy even if inconsistent with liberal consideration.
347. Kurta Memo, supra note 39, attach. ¶ 18.
348. SECNAVINST 5420.174D, supra note 70. Even though the Navy website lists December
16, 2015, as the “modified” date, the instruction was last updated December 22, 2004. Id. app. D.
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There is a presumption of regularity in the conduct of governmental
affairs. This presumption can be applied in any review unless there
is substantial credible evidence to rebut the presumption. 349
Proposed Revision:
211.
Regularity of Government Affairs
a. In cases not involving mental health conditions, there is a
presumption of regularity in the conduct of governmental
affairs. This presumption can be applied unless there is
substantial credible evidence to rebut the presumption.
b. In discharge upgrade applications involving a mental
health condition350 as potentially mitigating the
misconduct that was the basis for discharge, the
presumption of regularity in the conduct of government
affairs shall not apply. Instead, the Board will apply the
liberal consideration policy guidance set forth in the Kurta
Memo to fully consider the discharge upgrade request with
the understanding that the government has no favored
position in cases involving discharges with diagnosed or
undiagnosed mental health conditions.
Example 2:
Existing Text of Instruction:
403.
Conduct of Reviews
m. Evidence and Testimony
(6) There is a presumption of regularity in the conduct of governmental
affairs. This presumption will be applied in any review unless there is substantial
credible evidence to rebut the presumption.351
Proposed Revision:
403.
Conduct of Reviews
m. Evidence and Testimony
(6)(a) In cases not involving a mental health condition, there is a
presumption of regularity in the conduct of governmental affairs.
This presumption can be applied unless there is substantial credible
evidence to rebut the presumption.
(b) In discharge upgrade applications involving a mental health
condition as potentially mitigating the misconduct that was the
basis for discharge, the presumption of regularity in the conduct of
349. Id. para. 211.
350. An alternative proposal is to include the Kurta Memo’s specifically named mental health
conditions, “PTSD; TBI; sexual assault; and sexual harassment,” supra note 39, attach. ¶¶ 26(d)–(e), as
a way to limit the change to the presumption. But that list could prove too restrictive as more becomes
understood about mental health conditions and military service. A broader term here would allow room
for developments in the research of mental health conditions and their relationships to behavior, as well
as create flexibility to respond to the evolving nature of the military.
351. SECNAVINST 5420.174D, supra note 70, para. 403(m)(6).
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government affairs shall not apply. Instead, the Board will apply
the liberal consideration policy guidance set forth in the Kurta
Memo to fully consider the discharge upgrade request with the
understanding that the government has no favored position in cases
involving discharges with diagnosed or undiagnosed mental health
conditions.
(c) Liberal consideration relaxes the evidentiary standard in the
veteran’s favor.
These changes would eliminate the conflict between liberal consideration and
the presumption of government regularity in cases involving mental health
conditions. The absence of the presumption would force the Board to grapple
with liberal consideration to explain its decisions.
These suggestions are offered as examples of the comprehensive changes
needed to resolve conflicts between liberal consideration and service-specific
policy. The Navy and all services should conduct a comprehensive review of
internal policies and procedures, identify all the conflicting provisions, and
update them accordingly. Though this Article does not identify and offer revision
for every Navy policy in need of updating to comply with liberal consideration,
the examples here could serve as templates for the rest of the work.
4. Improve Oversight and Accountability for Compliance with
Liberal Consideration
Greater and enforced accountability for the boards’ compliance with liberal
consideration is critical. One way to improve accountability by eliminating or at
least lessening bias against upgrades would be to rebuild the boards themselves
with all new members, including a medical practitioner and a lawyer. Again,
considering the NDRB as an example, one approach would be to remove all
existing board members and the president of the NDRB in light of the deeply
rooted bias and little likelihood that the Board would on its own suddenly comply
with liberal consideration. Even though the Board regularly rotates, a completely
fresh start may be the most likely path to success. Such a measure, however,
could displace institutional knowledge and raise questions of consistency and
continuity.
A more tempered approach would be to restructure the Board over time to
change the pool of board members to always include junior and senior enlisted
personnel and non-veteran civilians. For example, a five-member board could
include two enlisted personnel (one junior and one senior), two officers, and one
civilian with no prior military service. Changing the membership and the pools
of members will at least limit the overwhelming bias in favor of commanders’
decisions. Enlisted servicemembers may not necessarily favor upgrades, but they
may offer a perspective for the experiences that led to their fellow enlisted
servicemembers requesting discharge upgrades. Moreover, including a civilian
on the board presents an opportunity for a broader perspective free from any
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biases or presumptions developed as part of military service. Thus, with only two
officers on a five-member board, the opportunity for bias is minimized. With
these former commanders in a minority, the officers may contribute to an overall
higher quality of decision-making that requires grappling with issues that may
have gone unaddressed or received only superficial attention under the current
Board’s makeup.352
Additionally, each board should include at least one medical practitioner.
There is already a statutory requirement that the boards “shall include a member
who is a clinical psychologist or psychiatrist, or a physician with training on
mental health issues connected with [PTSD] or [TBI]” in specific cases.353 These
special cases are limited to diagnosed mental health conditions. The requirement
should expand to include a clinical psychologist or psychiatrist, or a specially
trained physician, for all cases involving mental health conditions, specifically
including those without a diagnosis. This would create the opportunity for some
medical evaluation of the record and at least potentially interrupt the boards’
historical response to reject upgrade requests in the absence of a diagnosis. Even
though there may be some efficiency lost for those upgrade applications that do
not involve mental health conditions, there may be veterans who do not
specifically identify a mental health condition as part of their request for a
discharge but have indicators in their record that a medically trained board
member could recognize or identify as a basis to request additional information
before making a decision.
Furthermore, at least one lawyer or judge should be on each board, perhaps
even as a non-voting member. Adding a law-trained member to the board could
strengthen the decision-making process because lawyers are trained to read,
interpret, and apply the law. The Kurta Memo’s guidance is robust and
complicated, creating a challenging framework for anyone, but perhaps even
more so for the typical non-lawyer board members. Lawyers and judges are held
to, and often hold themselves to, ethical standards of professionalism and
accountability.354 They understand the critical need for substantiating decisions
and avoiding bias. A lawyer’s presence on the board could inject these ethical
352. In response to the backlogs and varied approval rates among the service boards reported in
2018, Representative Jackie Speier proposed a unified review board to ensure fairness. Shane, supra
note 77. A unified review board could lead to easier oversight and accountability of a single board, but
a consolidated board may not necessarily lead to more efficiency or consistency. Id. In any event, the
process of creating a unified board would not in itself solve the problems with illiberal application of
liberal consideration. An overhaul of the process has also been proposed by Human Rights Watch.
Human Rights Watch concluded that there needs to be wholesale changes in how the military reviews
such discharges, including the right to hearings where military personnel can tell their stories. See
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 28, at 13. Cases should be recorded, summarized, and available to
petitioners to help guide their appeals. See id.
353. 10 U.S.C. § 1553(d) (2018).
354. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018) (describing
the basic client-lawyer relationship as one requiring “legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and
preparation”); MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT canon 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2001) (recognizing
values of “independence, integrity, and impartiality”).
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standards into the board’s operations and decision-making, to the benefit of both
the veteran applicants and the board members.
Accountability also requires more individualized attention in decisions.
Like the other boards’ decisions, many of the NDRB’s decisions reflect
boilerplate responses, and the nature of boilerplate indicates a lack of the
individualized attention that liberal consideration requires. That decisions have
the same “reasons” for denial before and after liberal consideration also suggests
that the boards have not complied with liberal consideration to the extent that it
requires a different approach to decision-making. Here, an internal, non-judicial
method of oversight would be helpful to ensure compliance with liberal
consideration. Even an artificial-intelligence method could check for whether the
boards’ approach to decisions is individualized by identifying all phrases,
sentences, and paragraphs that are repeated in decisions. Of course, to some
extent, reuse of language makes sense: it is an efficiency tool and many of the
decisions do involve similar facts and issues. However, liberal consideration
requires that the Board do more; efficiency does not outweigh liberal
consideration’s overall purpose of fairness and justice.
A robust training program would also help with accountability and create
opportunities for growth in how the boards function. For example, implicit bias
training could be an effective method for board members to learn to recognize
when their implicit biases are getting in the way of liberal consideration.355 The
boards could also consider joint training with one another to share and learn best
practices and work toward more consistency among the boards. This joint
training could be a particularly effective method for contributing to revised DoD
standards with buy-in from all the services. Of course, training is time away from
the hearings and decisions in an already-backlogged system, but additional
delays are worth an overall better process and result for veterans.356
Finally, in terms of accountability, the boards must comply with reporting
requirements. The Board is currently not meeting its reporting requirements or
its public reading room requirements, and there seems to be no penalty for these

355. Given that the board members typically have a non-law-trained background, another
potential training would cover how boilerplate language is insufficient for the often-complex issues
raised in discharge upgrade decisions to better equip the board for the individualized decision-making
process.
356. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (NDAA) calls for more
training for board members and other improvements. The Act directs the discharge review boards and
military records corrections boards to seek “advice and counsel . . . from a psychiatrist, psychologist, or
social worker with training on mental health issues associated with post-traumatic stress disorder or
traumatic brain injury or other trauma.” 10 U.S.C. § 1552(g)(2) (2020). The statute also requires the
Defense Secretary to establish a final review procedure giving the Defense Secretary authority to review
a discharge upgrade request and to recommend upgrade to the Secretary of the military department. 10
U.S.C. § 1553(a) (2020). The boards’ training curriculum has been expanded to include the topics of
sexual trauma, intimate partner violence, spousal abuse, and “various responses of individuals to
trauma.” § 1553 note. The NDAA also calls for reducing the required number of board members from
five to “not fewer than three.” § 1553(a).
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shortcomings.357 To increase accountability, DoD should implement new
standards to ensure accurate and timely reporting of data, commit to a
redeveloped website that allows future applicants to access decisions in ways
that help them understand how to write a successful application, and reprimand
board members for their failures in these areas.358
Improved accountability during the discharge process is also worth
mentioning here. As awareness of the relationship between PTSD and combatrelated activities, military sexual assault, or sexual harassment has grown,
military leaders should take on the burden of providing fair discharges at the
outset, to avoid any need of a later upgrade. A more expansive meaning of
Honorable would also help here, to encourage a cultural shift in how the military
makes discharge decisions. Liberal consideration should be the driving force
both at the discharge review boards and also at the command-level decisions
when faced with servicemembers experiencing mental health conditions. Instead
of focusing on “the effects of substance abuse . . . on . . . discipline and
performance,”359 for a case involving PTSD, commanders should, as is
consistent with liberal consideration, consider PTSD as mitigating the behavior.
Without change on the inside consistent with change at the discharge review
stage, military leaders will continue on the same path, funneling the next
generation of the forgotten on to the discharge review boards where, so far,
veterans have every reason to expect the same historic hostility.
CONCLUSION
The ongoing class action lawsuits serve as a potential enforcement
mechanism for liberal consideration and may create a path to a broader solution.
Just as the Vietnam veterans’ class action lawsuit led to the Hagel Memo’s
introduction of liberal consideration, the Kennedy and Manker class actions may
lead to further policy guidance. However, as has been demonstrated, policy
guidance alone will not solve the problems at the discharge review boards.
Furthermore, based on the specific definitions of the classes, the Kennedy and
Manker cases can potentially provide relief only to a limited group. Veterans,
357. See supra note 200 and accompanying text. Even though the public reading room is again
available, the decisions are not “indexed in a usable and concise form so as to enable the public, and
those who represent applicants before the DRBs, to isolate from all these decisions that are indexed,
those cases that may be similar to an applicant’s case and that indicate the circumstances under or
reasons for (or both) which” a request was granted or denied. See 32 C.F.R. § 724.810(d) (2018). In the
context of requesting records from the Board for Correction of Naval Records, the Navy has established
itself as resistant to sharing records. Without increased accessibility, “it will remain difficult to conduct
a more comprehensive and accurate assessment of the branch’s performance regarding PTSD-based
claims.” SIDIBE & UNGER, supra note 26, at 7. Human Rights Watch also called for “searchable and
accessible” decisions and “[enforcement of] the requirement that Boards publish, summarize, and index
all decisions.” HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 28, at 121.
358. “The development of discharge upgrades and the Department of Defense’s retooling of
regulation to prevent unjust discharge from occurring in the first place will be worth tracking in the next
few years as these efforts come to fruition and spark new efforts.” Simcox, supra note 26, at 572.
359. Chapman, supra note 28, at 14.
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whether included in a class or not, deserve to be recognized for their honorable
service, especially when that service comes at the cost of a mental health
condition.
With some or all of the proposed changes described above to redefine
Honorable or revise internal policies and procedures, there will be a need to
reconsider prior board decisions denying relief. That will be a daunting task, but
well worth it for those who were previously denied true liberal consideration.
For example, a temporary review board could review Michelle’s case and grant
relief in the form of an Honorable discharge without requiring any additional
documents from her. On the record alone, there is enough to grant relief,
consistent with liberal consideration and an expanded definition of Honorable.
This review should be done for all liberal consideration cases that were denied
relief or granted only partial relief.
Future applicants and their advocates should use the boards’ weaknesses to
strengthen their applications. For example, with an understanding of the boards’
bias in favor of the original discharge decision, an application should remind the
board that liberal consideration requires abandoning that bias and giving full
liberal consideration to an upgrade involving a mental health condition. Future
applicants could also stress how an expanded definition of Honorable is
consistent with liberal consideration to show the board that they are deserving of
an Honorable discharge. Upgrade requests should be reframed to show how a
veteran deserves an Honorable discharge because he suffered or suffers from a
mental health condition and because that condition mitigates his misconduct.
With that approach, the boards may be more likely to extend the hand of liberal
consideration to honor these other-than-honorably discharged veterans and break
the kicked out–kicked again cycle.
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